The impact of oil price changes on selected economic indicators in South Africa by Vellem, Nomtha
  
THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICE CHANGES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
By 
Nomtha Vellem 
201112718 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Commerce in Economics (Research) 
in the 
 
Faculty of Management and Commerce 
at the 
 
University of Fort Hare 
East London 
South Africa 
 
Supervisor: Mrs P. Makhetha-Kosi 
 
2014 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The study examines the effect of oil price changes on selected economic indicators in South 
Africa. A VAR-5 model was applied to quarterly data of 1990:Q1-2012:Q4 estimating the 
impulse response functions, variance decomposition and Granger-causality tests. The 
findings allow for a conclusion that oil significantly affects the exchange rate and an inverse 
link between oil and GDP exists. A unidirectional relation is found where oil Granger-causes 
the exchange rate and GDP Granger-causes oil in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Oil is an important raw-material resource for the production of a wide range of goods and 
services. Different economic sectors particularly the transportation, construction; 
industrial and power-producing sectors are widely dependent on oil (Zaytsev, 2010). As an 
international commodity and as oil prices are linked, like those of other commodities, to 
levels of economic activity, no country can effectively take actions that do not directly or 
indirectly affect other nations (Pirog, 2005). Watkins (2006) states that oil will leave the 
economic system when it becomes more expensive than alternative sources of energy or 
when the end uses it satisfies are no longer there. The oil commodity is important for South 
Africa as a less energy-intensive country. South Africa imports oil from countries with a 
much more significant spare capacity. These include economies such as Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria and Angola to name a few.  
Crude oil remains volatile and threatens already-fragile global economic conditions (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2012). Both oil price and the macroeconomic variables - the measure 
of economic performance as a whole - are leading economic indicators which drive the 
evolution of the world economy (Coudert, Mignon and Penot, 2008). Their changes deeply 
affect international trade and economic activity of countries. As the state of the economy 
affects everyone, macroeconomic variables play a central role in the lives of people. During 
tight economic times, consumers demand less of oil products in response to their 
decreased disposable income. Households may ask for increasing wages, leading to price 
wage loops while firms on the other hand, can pass the oil price increase on to selling 
prices (Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008). An increase in oil prices impacts trade of oil importer 
countries like South Africa negatively and as such, countries have to pay a relatively higher 
price to purchase one barrel of oil whereas oil exporting countries stand to benefit from 
foreign revenue which they could harness for their development (Barsky and Kilian, 2004).  
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Given the importance of oil to the global economy and its mechanisms of transmission, 
devotion has been made with regards to exploring the implications of historic, current and 
prospective oil prices on economic indicators in South Africa. The study examines why and 
how these variables change overtime, if oil prices could be the result of the change and how 
they interact with one another. The economic indicators the study focuses on include: 
exchange rate, inflation rate, interest rate, the Gross Domestic Product and their impact 
thereof in which they are linked to oil prices.  
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The 2007/8 period was characterised by large magnitudes of oil price increases that had 
serious implications on the economy. During 2003, oil traded between US$28 and US$36 
per barrel but in early 2007 to mid 2008 the price of oil per barrel skyrocketed from about 
US$60 to a record high of US$147 per barrel. This growth occurred on the back of the rapid 
industrialisation of China and India and a strong US economy, underpinned by easy credit 
and ever-growing housing prices (Molavi, 2011). A global recovery resumed in 2010. A 
moderation in prices in the second quarter of 2012, according to the SARB (2012), was 
followed by increases, primarily in response to geopolitical tensions in the Middle East but 
also to monetary policy easing in major economies. Global oil supply at 90, 8 million barrels 
per day in the second quarter of 2012 outstripped demand of 89, 0 million barrels per day. 
The international oil price gradually trended lower throughout most of the second quarter 
of 2012, declining by almost 30% from a high in March to an 18-month low of US$88 per 
barrel towards the end of June. The price of Brent crude oil then rebounded from an 
average of US$96 per barrel in June, fluctuating between US$97 and US$118 as it gradually 
increased to an average of US$113 in October. Towards the end of October the Dollar oil 
price was only about 14% below the high in March 2012 but almost 25% below the peak in 
2008 at the onset of the financial crisis. At current levels, oil prices remain high in nominal 
and real terms. 
The oil price volatility in recent years renewed an interest in the effects of oil prices on 
selected economic indicators which seem to generate increased uncertainty in economic 
indicators. Interest rates and inflation are slow to fall. The value of the Rand keeps on 
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depreciating. Investors are postponing their decisions and consumer confidence is sinking. 
Until all the uncertainty ends or atleast reduces, economic stability is highly unlikely to 
occur. 
Adelman (1986) states that such fluctuations present difficult challenges towards economic 
stability as many investment decisions depend on the expected price of crude oil. In line 
with this view, Ferderer (1990) also highlights that oil prices remain high even though 
world oil production has returned to pre-crisis levels while Sill (2007) believes that oil 
price spikes prompt instability about the future often leading to investment delays for 
firms and purchases by households. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The primary objective is to examine the impact of oil price changes on selected economic 
indicators in South Africa. 
The specific objectives are: 
 To review the nature and trends of oil prices and economic indicators. 
 To examine the impact of oil prices on the South African exchange rate, inflation 
rate, interest rate and Gross Domestic Product for the period 1990-2012. 
 Based on empirical findings, to make conclusions and policy recommendations. 
1.4 Hypotheses to be tested 
The hypothesis to be tested is arranged as follows: 
0H : Oil prices do not have a negative impact on selected South African economic 
indicators. 
1H : Oil Prices have a negative impact on selected South African economic indicators. 
1.5 Justification of the study 
The oil crisis since the early 1970s and the successive recessions have encouraged great 
interest of scholars to research on the relationship between oil price shocks and 
macroeconomy (Hamilton, 1983; Ferderer, 1990; Dotsey and Reid, 1992; Kilian, 2008; Du, 
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He and Wei 2010). Hamilton (1983) characterised nine out of ten US recessions since 
World War II as having been prefaced by oil price rises. The rest of other scholars also 
display a strong relevancy of the relationship between oil prices and economic indicators. 
The past oil shocks have complicated decisions by policymakers. The increases in inflation 
during the 1970s have been associated with rapid increases in petroleum prices while the 
decline during the 1980s and 1990s has been associated with declines in oil prices 
(LeBlanc and Chinn, 2004). Hence a clear understanding of the magnitude of an empirical 
link between oil price changes and inflation is important to the proper conduct of monetary 
policy. LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) states that “...it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
impact of oil prices on the macroeconomy is now unimportant.” However, the way oil 
prices influence the economies may differ in effects from country to country depending on 
the nature and structure of the economy. The effects may also have evolved through time. 
The mechanisms which were at work in the course of historical oil shocks may not 
necessarily apply today. A lot has changed since then. Most central banks have shifted their 
monetary policy from output targets to targeting inflation and also most countries have 
moved away from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes and are independent which was 
not the situation in the 1970s.  
Macroeconomic issues are at the center of world politics in the sense that when nation 
leaders meet, these topics are often high on their agendas. Through this study, the 
government may be able to do financial deals with a better understanding of the country’s 
oil market and to revisit current policies to something applicable to date. Business 
executives use economic indicators to forecast the demand for their products; students are 
able to evaluate the state of the economy and its impact on their future in terms of 
employment opportunities, ordinary households to determine how fast prices will rise, 
their effect on their disposable income and household consumption.  
Numerous studies have focused on the impact of oil price movements on one or two 
economic indicators; this study extends the scope of the analysis to various links between 
oil prices and several economic indicators including: the exchange rate of the Rand, 
inflation rate, interest rate and Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, emphasis on the 
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existing literature lies heavily on developed countries (Dotsey and Reid, 1992; Barsky and 
Kilian, 2004; Balke, Brown and Yucel, 2010 and Basher, Haug and Sadorsky, 2012). Little 
has been done for emerging economies like South Africa. Empirical approach with little 
theoretical underpinnings or theoretical approach with limited empirical application was 
employed in previous research. Building on this work, the current study employs theory 
and empirics to fill the gap.  
1.6 Layout of the study 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: this chapter is followed by chapter 2, which 
looks at the overview of the oil price market and the proposed economic indicators in the 
South African context. In chapter 3, theoretical and empirical studies pertaining to the issue 
of oil price movements and economic indicators are discussed. Chapter 4 provides the 
methodology and data while chapter 5 reviews empirical results and discusses findings. 
Finally the conclusion, policy recommendation and limitations to the study are presented 
in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE TRENDS IN OIL PRICE MARKET AND THE PROPOSED 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline trends, nature and composition of the impact of oil 
price changes on selected economic indicators in South Africa. A broad overview of 
economic indicators in South Africa such as exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and 
Gross Domestic Product will be illustrated graphically and explained in greater detail. 
2.2 The background and the role of OPEC 
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an international 
organisation of eleven developing and oil-exporting countries1. The OPEC member 
countries are well endowed with oil reserves and as such are responsible for most of global 
oil supply and production. The world heavily relies on imported oil from OPEC.   
OPEC played no significant role in the production or pricing of crude oil until the early 
1970’s (Fattouh, 2007). Large multinational oil companies known as the Seven Sisters were 
recognised as the main oil supplies and price-setters of oil. Oil trading was under the 
shadow of these companies and had no free market functioning outside the control of the 
Seven Sisters. The multinational oil companies balanced their positions on the basis of 
long-term contracts but the prices in these contracts were never disclosed. Governments 
obtained only fewer revenues based on ‘posted price’. However, the posted price as a fiscal 
restriction did not respond to the market forces of supply and demand and hence did not 
play any signalling role. 
Changes in the oil market arose in 1960 upon the arrival of crude oil from the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) and other oil companies, other than the Seven Sisters, were able to 
obtain access to crude oil. This began challenging the dominance of the multinational oil 
                                                             
1
 Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Angola, Ecuador 
and Venezuela 
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companies. However, even so, the changes were not strong enough to threaten the Seven 
Sisters or its ‘posted price’ system. The OPEC countries were also still not influential by that 
time to change the existing pricing regime. Thus, the multinational oil companies 
maintained their dominance both in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry 
for most of the 1960s. 
Major transformations were seen in the early 1970’s as tight supply and demand 
conditions emerged. An increased global oil demand enhanced the power of OPEC relative 
to the multinational oil companies as most of the increase in demand was met by OPEC 
countries. Consequently, major transformations occurred in the oil pricing system which 
led to the price setting power shift from the multinational oil companies to OPEC. 
Negotiations between multinational oil companies and OPEC to increase oil prices took 
place but without success. Upon failure of agreement in October 1973, six Gulf members of 
OPEC unilaterally announced an immediate increase in the posted price of the Arab light 
crude from US$3.65 to US$5.119. The posted price of the Arab light was raised further by 
OPEC in December 1973 to US$11.651. Such events proved to introduce a change in the 
pricing system. OPEC assumed a unilateral role in setting posted prices while previously it 
had only been able to prevent oil companies from reducing them. At the centre of the new 
pricing system was the marker or reference price with individual member countries setting 
their prices in relation to the price of the Arab light, which became the marker crude and in 
the late 1970s, the multinational oil companies lost large reserves of crude oil and became 
increasingly dependent on OPEC supplies.  
Since 1973, when OPEC obtained its power to influence prices, OPEC sets a floor to prices. 
This is arguable however, other scholars believe the prices of oil are solely determined by 
supply and demand conditions while other researchers argue that OPEC as the lead 
producer of oil gives atleast a minimum direction for oil prices but takes into account 
fluctuations in economic conditions (Hamilton 1983; Wakeford 2006). The oil prices can 
either be a rise (positive) or a fall (negative).  
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2.3 The former events of oil price shocks 
The crucial component of crude oil brings forth a need to review the former events of oil 
price shocks over time and the reasons behind the shocks. Five events are discussed and 
shown below. 
Table 2. 1: The five events 
Period Start-price (per 
barrel) 
End-price (per 
barrel) 
The origin(s) 
 
1973-74 
 
US$3 
 
US$11.50 
 
Arab-Israel war and 
OPEC collusion on 
price setting 
 
 
1978/79-80 
 
US$14 
 
US$35 
 
Iranian revolution 
and Iran-Iraq war 
 
 
 
1990 
 
US$17 
 
US$35 
 
Iraq-Kuwait 
destruction 
 
 
 
2003-2006* 
 
US$25 
 
US$78 
 
Natural causes and 
geopolitical factors 
 
 
 
2007-2008* 
 
US$63 
 
US$96 
 
Growing demand 
and stagnant supply 
 
 
Source: *Wakeford (2006); ** Hamilton (2011) 
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2.3.1 Arab-Israeli war and OPEC collusion on price setting (1973-1974) 
An oil embargo imposed by the Arab members of OPEC2 came as a result of the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1973. The complete ban of oil exports initially aimed at the United States but later 
extended to other countries that supported Israel: the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa 
and Rhodesia (United States Department of State, 2013; Hamilton, 2011). During this 
period, cuts in OPEC’s total oil production were also introduced. Following these occasions, 
a sharp increase in the prices of oil to high levels such as US$11.50 was experienced.  
2.3.2 Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq war (1978/79 - 80) 
The Iranian revolution, where public protests took place, resulted in the loss of oil 
production but it was not long before Iranian oil production returned to its pre-
revolutionary levels. However, when Iraq launched a war against Iran in 1980, a combined 
loss of production from both of the two OPEC countries brought world production down 
resulting to significant oil price increases. 
2.3.3 Iraq-Kuwait destruction (1990) 
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq incurred huge debts from the losses of oil revenues. To 
generate more revenues so it could pay off its debt to states from which it borrowed money 
from during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq wanted prices of oil to be up. However, most OPEC 
members, notably Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) cheated on the OPEC quota 
production agreement when they produced higher amounts of oil than those which had 
been assigned to them and oil prices dropped instead. When Kuwait continuously 
produced above its regulated levels, Iraq was convinced that excess oil production by 
Kuwait was intentional. Thereafter, Iraq embarked on a destruction of Kuwait. The loss of 
the production from both countries greatly impacted negatively on world oil production 
and following the destruction, oil prices rose to US$35. Again, when Saudi Arabia 
attempted to play a mediator role to resolve the conflict, although it was not successful, 
concerns that the conflict would extend to Saudi Arabia contributed further to oil price 
increases (Hamilton, 2011).  
                                                             
2
 Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
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2.3.4 Natural causes and geopolitical factors (2003 - 06) 
Strikes in South America’s largest supplier of oil, Venezuela, leaking pipeline leading to 
temporary closure of Alaska Prudhoe Bay Field, Iraq conflict, Nigerian conflict, conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah as well as continuous speculation of the oil market are all 
factors constituting a significant oil price rise during this period. The global economic 
growth experienced in 2004-2005 also allowed for increased demand for oil and as a 
result, world consumption went up. Production grew slower than demand and after 2005; 
it did not continue to grow (Hamilton, 2011). 
2.3.5 Growing demand and stagnant supply (2007 - 08) 
The contradiction of oil supply and demand put pressure on oil prices (Van der Heijden and 
Tsedu, 2008). In response to this, prices increased to ease off pressure on oil demand as 
OPEC members are mindful of the notion that oil is a commodity restricted in amount. 
Fears that world’s oil reserves were reaching an end were also thought of as having led to 
increases in the prices of oil. 
2.4 The nature of the oil market  
According to CIA (2014), South Africa had only about 15 million barrels proved reserves of 
crude oil on 1 January 2013. As stated by Encharter (n.d.), proved reserves refer to “the 
estimated quantities of oil which geological and engineering data demonstrate with 
reasonable certainty to be commercially recoverable in future years with existing 
technologies from known reserves under prevailing economic and operating conditions. A 
probability of 90% (P90) is sometimes used to define proved reserves”. Table 2.2 shows 
the proved world oil reserves by region, as it stands by the end of 1998, 2007 and 2008. 
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Table 2. 2: Proved oil reserves (thousand million barrels) 
Region                            End of 1998                     End of 2007              End of 2008 
 
North America  65.3   71.3   70.9 
South & Cen. America 95.6   123.5   123.2 
Europe & Eurasia  104.9   144.6   142.2 
Middle East   684.3   755.0   754.1 
Africa    77.2   125.3   125.6 
Asia Pacific   41.3   41.3   42.0 
Total World   1068.5  1261.0  1258.0 
OPEC    827.2   957.1   955.8 
Non-OPEC   157.6   174.7   174.4 
Former Soviet  83.8   129.2   127.8                
Source: BP Statistical Review (2009) 
According to Table 2.2 above, a substantial portion of proved oil reserves was situated in 
the OPEC member countries in 1998, 2007 and 2008. OPEC members control about 43.2% 
(BP, 2013) of oil production and as such, a large part of international oil price is controlled 
by OPEC. All the OPEC member countries are aware that oil is a limited resource therefore 
they control demand and supply pressures by changing oil prices accordingly.  
Most of these countries are comprised of nations from the Middle East3, a region highly 
prone to geopolitical factors. In 2008, about 60% of global oil reserves were in the Middle 
East making the region extremely crucial and of strategic importance for the future oil 
supply requirements of the industrialised and other emerging economies. Out of the 754.1 
billion barrels of oil reserves available in the Middle East in 2008, 264.1 million barrels (or 
21.0%) was concentrated in Saudi Arabia. Other countries with huge oil reserves after 
                                                             
3
 Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Oman and Qatar 
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Saudi Arabia included Iran, Iraq and Kuwait-all with a proved reserve of over 100 million 
barrels of oil.  
 
Figure 2. 1: Oil production 
Source: BP (2013) 
According to Gupta (2008), in almost 50 countries of the world, production of oil has 
attained its highest level. Although the United States (US) still produces large amounts of 
oil relative to those countries shown on Figure 2.1, oil production in the country reached its 
highest point in 1972. Consequently, the influential role in crude oil prices shifted from the 
United States to OPEC. Canada peaked in 1973, Indonesia in 1998, Norway in 2001 and 
Mexico in 2002.  
China, Brazil and the United Kingdom (UK) do not produce significant amounts of oil. The 
US and most European countries obtain large amounts of their oil from non-OPEC sources 
but as the production in non OPEC countries where they source this commodity from begin 
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reaching its maximum and decline, consuming countries will become dependent on OPEC 
for oil imports (Gupta, 2008). As a result, OPEC’s position to affect oil prices will be more 
and the growing dependence on the same source will eventually stimulate high prices of 
oil.  
Figure 2.2 examines trends in oil consumption for the groupings to see how these differ 
from oil production movements.  A most important fact for understanding the nature of oil, 
as indicated by Hamilton (2009), is that income rather than price is the key determinant of 
the quantity demanded where economic expansion is observed as an important factor 
driving an increase in oil demand.  
 
Figure 2. 2: Oil consumption 
Source: BP (2013) 
Oil consumption mostly grows in non-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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prices. From Figure 2.2, oil consumption in the US accounts for most of global oil 
consumption. This is not surprising considering its economic well-being. China, Brazil and 
the UK consumed 10221 tb/d, 2805 tb/d and 1468 tb/d in 2012 respectively.  
China’s oil consumption has been increasing throughout from 5771 tb/d in 2003 to 10221 
tb/d in 2012. The increasing demand from major emerging economies particularly China 
and India has played a powerful role in keeping oil prices continually high in past years 
(ADBG, 2014). Despite the global economic recession in 2007, China’s demand for oil 
remained high which kept oil prices at high levels whereas OPEC was not investing 
sufficiently to meet raising oil demand from emerging economies in Asia. As a result, spare 
capacity fell persistently.  
2.5 South Africa’s oil market 
The world economy has become so globalised. Through stronger trade and financial 
linkages, macroeconomic shocks in one country disseminate to the rest of the world (Ruch, 
2013). This is especially true for South Africa which joined the international world of 
trading in 1994. South Africa has empowered its access to international trade by adopting 
an open-economy strategy (Wakeford, 2006). This puts the country in a position to import 
goods which it is not well-endowed for, including crude oil. Domestic demands for liquid 
fuels in South Africa are therefore either imported or met via a highly developed domestic 
synthetic fuels industry dominated by two firms: SASOL and PetroSA (Amusa, Wabiri and 
Chetty, 2008). 
According to DME (2005b), there is about 36% of liquid fuels demand that is met by 
domestic synthetic fuels (produced from coal and gas) and 64% is imported. SAPIA (2006) 
reveals that 95% of South Africa’s crude oil is sourced from OPEC. The world’s biggest 
producer of oil from coal, SASOL, produces approximately 23% of South Africa’s petroleum 
needs (Van Der Heijden and Tsedu, 2008). The other 13% is produced oil from gas. An 
alternative to obtain oil but which no longer stands was through biofuels sourced from 
agricultural commodities, specifically ethanol from maize and sugar, however, this strategy 
was discontinued due to food security challenges in the country.  
15 
 
Although the cost of production of both firms is below the prevailing international price of 
oil; but since all petroleum products in South Africa are regulated to be priced at import 
parity which is composed of the import price, tariff and transport cost to the firm’s or 
consumers’ location, firms are not able to sell such products at a lesser price (Van Der 
Heijden and Tsedu, 2008). This implies that South Africa is not able to source oil cheaper. 
This also leaves the country as a price taker on the oil market regardless of whether it 
chooses to obtain oil from the afore-mentioned local companies or decides to get it from 
abroad.  
2.5.1 Crude oil supply source risk weights 
South Africa’s vulnerability to external economic shocks was clearly disclosed during the 
recent economic crisis. Most African countries proved to be dependent on few export 
commodities relative to large import commodities (OECD, 2011). The dependence on 
imported commodities, especially from high-risk regions (see Table 2.3) as evidenced by 
historic events, makes South Africa vulnerable to economic and national security 
challenges (Wabiri and Amusa, 2011). 
Table 2. 3: Crude oil supply source risk weights 
Region  Percentage 
Middle East 34. 7 
Africa 19. 2 
South America 14. 7 
Russia 10. 3 
North America 10. 
Europe 5. 4 
Source: Wabiri and Amusa (2011) 
The country’s oil-import diversification index reached a lowest of 0.68% in 2007, which is 
indicative that South Africa has improved in diversifying the number of sources from which 
it imports crude oil supplies (Wabiri and Amusa, 2011). Gupta (2008) claims that two-
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thirds of global oil is transported by sea and chokepoints are susceptible to shipping 
accidents and terrorist attacks. Multiple suppliers allow for reduced vulnerability in times 
of temporary or permanent disruption of supply. Therefore, “should one supplier fall victim 
of natural disasters, terrorism, war, regime change or other export-damaging events, 
importers will experience only minor disruptions to their supply” (Leiby, 2007).  
2.5.2 South Africa’s crude oil import sources 
Iran used to be South Africa’s largest crude oil supplier, accounting for about 27% of the 
country’s oil imports in 2011 (EIA, 2014). However, after the US and European Union (EU) 
sanctions against Iran were imposed in 2012, South Africa’s crude oil imports from Iran 
dropped and in 2013 the country had substituted its crude oil imports with supplies from 
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Angola (EIA, 2014). Figure 2.3 below illustrates South Africa’s 
crude oil import sources in 2013 from January to November.  
 
Figure 2. 3: South Africa’s crude oil imports 
Source: EIA (2014)                          
Half of South Africa’s crude oil imports came from Saudi Arabia, almost a quarter came 
from Nigeria, followed by Angola. Only small amounts came from various producers in 
other countries (7%) and Ghana (5%). 
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2.6 Economic indicators 
2.6.1 The oil prices, CPI and repo movements 
The annual oil prices have been volatile over the past three decades particularly around the 
time of the third and fourth oil price shocks. As an ongoing upward trend in oil prices 
manifested in 2007; inflation in February was at 5.7% and accelerated up to 13.7% by 
August 2008 during the financial crisis, going beyond the 6% ceiling of the South African 
Reserve Bank’s (SARB) target range. The increases in inflation were anchored by rising 
food and fuel prices and led to regular interest rate increases setting the repo rate at mostly 
12% during 2008. 
 
Figure 2. 4: Movements in oil prices, CPI and repo 
Source: SARB (2013) 
Deposits denominated in domestic currency became more attractive as compared to 
deposits denominated in foreign currency (Mishkin, 2004). The contractionary monetary 
policy resulted to an inflow of capital and the demand for the Rand rose causing the Rand 
to strengthen. The higher interest rates reduced disposable income of households and 
raised debt service costs (Van Der Heijden and Tsedu, 2008). Mboweni (2008) also 
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suggests that the growth in real final consumption expenditure by households that 
decelerated in 2007 was moderated by the effect of higher interest rates. 
While a discussion on food prices is beyond the scope of this study, the main effects of high 
oil prices were reflected in both the domestic petrol price and food prices as these 
commodities often move together (Mboweni, 2008). 
2.6.2 The oil prices, exchange rate and petrol price movements 
In the period of 2007 to 2013 shown in Figure 2.5, the price for crude oil instigated a weak 
Rand and a hike in petrol prices. Fuel prices determine food and many petroleum products. 
The prices of most products increase as fuel prices increase because products in South 
Africa are mostly moved around the country by the road-based transport system. The rail 
system is not widely used. 
 
Figure 2. 5: Movements in oil prices, exchange rate and petrol prices 
Source: SARB and DoE (2013) 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
 2
0
0
7/
01
 
 2
0
0
7/
05
 
 2
0
0
7/
09
 
 2
0
0
8/
01
 
 2
0
0
8/
05
 
 2
0
0
8/
09
 
 2
0
0
9/
01
 
 2
0
0
9/
05
 
 2
0
0
9/
09
 
 2
0
1
0/
01
 
 2
0
1
0/
05
 
 2
0
1
0/
09
 
 2
0
1
1/
01
 
 2
0
1
1/
05
 
 2
0
1
1/
09
 
 2
0
1
2/
01
 
 2
0
1
2/
05
 
 2
0
1
2/
09
 
 2
0
1
3/
01
 
 2
0
1
3/
05
 
R1 = 100 cents 
and 
Cents per litre 
In US dollar per 
barrel 
Period 
Brent crude oil price: left axis 
Foreign exchange rate: SA cent per USA - right axis 
Gauteng price of 95 octane unleaded petrol: right axis 
19 
 
Businesses thus target increased food prices to get through to consumers as no household 
can diverge from purchasing such necessary items. Therefore, the poor majority of 
households in South Africa spend most of their money on food and less on other items 
while the rich minority has felt the effects of a hike in oil prices through higher fuel prices 
(Chisadza, Dlamini, Gupta and Modise, 2013). Moreover, good evidence suggests that prices 
of such products are downwardly ‘sticky’, they do not go down when petrol prices decline, 
and the increases are more likely to exceed the rate at which wages for households 
increase (Heijden and Tsedu, 2008). 
2.6.4 The oil and GDP movements 
Economic growth was particularly poor in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ferderer, 1990), as 
South Africa fell victim to increasing international isolation and civil conflict. The financial 
crisis of 2008, which had its origins in the US, significantly affected the economies of most 
countries. The BRICS4 economies as South Africa’s fellow developing economies are 
reviewed to compare the trends in their GDP. These countries together with South Africa 
are net importers of oil. The developed economies: US, the Euro area, UK and Japan are 
South Africa’s major trading partners that have dealt with oil price increases in the past.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
4
 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
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Figure 2. 6: Movements in oil and GDP 
Source: IMF (2013) 
South Africa’s GDP dropped from 5.55% in 2007 to 3.62% in 2008. As import prices rose, 
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emerging economies, primarily that of China and India. The impact of the 2007-8 crisis on 
China has been smaller than on the US, Japan, Germany, UK and other key industrialised 
economies, with the UK and other large industrialised economies experiencing negative 
growth, while China continued to grow at a fast rate. China is the only country with double 
digit growth in 2007. Strong monetary and fiscal policies were designed in order to achieve 
a growth of 8% in 2009 against a deeply depressed world economy (Yao and Chen, 2009).  
2.7 Conclusion 
Extraordinary oil price fluctuations in the oil market which mostly have been the result of 
external shocks beyond the control of South Africa were experienced in recent years. There 
have been five oil price shocks to date that are observed to have hit South Africa with 
different economic reasoning. Each of the shocks has had connections with movements in 
some economic indicators in South Africa. As a heavily dependent country of imported 
crude oil, South Africa is exposed to vulnerabilities related to crude oil. The macroeconomic 
environment in South Africa during positive oil shocks has been undesirable. 
The oil prices have been particularly volatile largely because of production disruptions and 
political instability in the oil-rich Middle East, notably the OPEC member countries and 
more so, the Asian nations. Through open-economy strategies adopted around the world, 
national economies are interdependent and as such economic and political adversities in 
one area often submerge to other regions. The dependence on politically difficult producing 
countries, peaking oil production, the insecurity about oil market conditions and large 
increases in oil demand of developing economies which have been the result of increased 
economic growth are contributing factors to the increased prices of oil while spare capacity 
has been less growing thereby inducing more pressure on prices of oil. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the literature of the impact of oil price changes on economic 
indicators. The section is divided into three parts in which the first part looks at the theory 
underpinning the study; the second part looks at empirical studies which have been 
established regarding the impact of oil price changes on economic indicators and the final 
part assesses the literature.  
3.2 Theoretical literature review  
This section discusses two theories which have been put forward to study the impact of oil 
price changes on economic indicators. These include the Hubbert hypothesis and the 
transmission mechanisms. 
3.2.1 Hubbert hypothesis 
The Hubbert theory of 1956 holds that, in any oil-geographic area, only a limited amount of 
oil is available. It identifies a pattern of depletion for oil and claims oil production to follow 
a bell-shaped curve. Upon discovering oil reserves in a region, production initially 
increases but as time progresses it reaches its highest point of production and begins to 
decline (Poyrazoglu, 2011).  
The theory estimated future discoveries based on data of past discoveries. Particularly, 
data from searching, finding and developing oil that took place for more than 75 years was 
used to measure how much oil existed in a given area and to predict when it would be gone 
(Murphy, 2008). Later in 1959, other elements were added to the analysis. First, Hubbert 
hypothesis “…specified a functional form for its prediction, the logistic curve, stating that 
cumulative production over time would follow a logistic curve, and thus that yearly 
production would follow the first derivative of the logistic curve, which is bell-shaped. The 
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theory plotted cumulated discoveries alongside cumulated production and noted that the 
curves were similar in shape but shifted in time” (Brandt, 2007). 
The basic assumptions proposed by the Hubbert model (Brandt, 2007; Bardi and Lavacchi, 
2009; Globalization101, 2014) are: 
 The pattern is the same for all oil-production and the time lag is constant. 
 Production increases and decreases in a single up-down cycle and is without 
multiple peaks. 
 When global production reaches the highest point on the bell curve, it would have 
reached its peak.   
 Following the discovery of fossil fuel reserves (oil, coal and natural gas), production 
increases exponentially as more extraction commences and more efficient facilities 
are installed and thereafter production exponentially declines. 
The theory can be illustrated by the following graph: 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1: Hubbert curve 
Source: Hubbert (1956) 
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Figure 3.1 provides a graphical depiction of the theory. The area under the curve 
represents the estimation of the amount of total oil available. The theory particularly 
predicted the US oil to reach its maximum production in 1970 and world peak production 
to reach its own in 2000.  
In the 1970s, the US peaked as per the prediction of the theory. The Hubbert hypothesis 
proved to be widely accepted as robust following its correct prediction of the US peak oil 
production and consequently induced much interest for scholars to determine global peak 
oil production (Barney, 1980; Campbell, 1997; Deffeyes, 2001). The period was also 
associated with the first oil shock of 1973-1974 since World War II where prices were 
dramatically high. The theory again proved to be correct, as it is arguable, when oil peaked 
worldwide in around 2005 (Murphy, 2008). When oil undergoes scarcity, as shown by the 
downward sloping of the bell-curve, it becomes expensive and a hike in the prices of oil is 
experienced. In the early 2000, particularly the 2003-2006 period was marked by large oil 
price increases.  
The approach has been subjected to both theoretical and empirical criticisms:  
 Theoretically, the theory is accused of lacking economic foundation by not 
considering economic factors such as prices. However several studies (Reynolds, 
1999; Bardi, 2005; Holland, 2008) attempting to fill this gap, although with different 
modeling strategies, hold that the production following a bell-shaped curve is the 
result of production costs which follow a U-shaped curve over time (Reynes, Okullo 
and Hofkes, 2010). This school of thought is linked to economic maximisation that 
when production costs decrease in a U-shaped curve, production increase in a bell-
shaped curve and when production costs increase in a U-shaped curve, production 
decrease in a bell-shaped curve. This is also in line with the demand effect that when 
the price increases (or decreases), demand decreases (or increases), and so does 
production.  
 Notwithstanding attempts undertaken by previous researchers to explain the 
economic link of the theory, the theoretical statement is believed not to be 
supported by empirical evidence. The producers, who experienced a decrease in 
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production in the past, were not solely constrained by demand. Although prices of 
oil increased, in some regions, demand did not stop increasing. As oil is a basic 
commodity, increases in world population and standard of living can also cause 
demand to be reluctant to decrease against rising oil prices.  
 Empirically, there is a controversy that global production did not begin declining in 
the early 2000s as the model had predicted. As a result, the reliability of the Hubbert 
model to accurately predict global oil production in the coming years is questioned. 
 Lastly, the current level of technological advances is perceived to provide 
possibilities for detecting new supplies of oil. Much more oil is yet to be known “just 
as there was much more oil hidden under the earth’s surface than most people 
imagined back in the 1970s, so too are there probably additional reserves that have 
not been identified by today’s oil producers” (Globalization101, 2014). 
3.2.2 Theoretical models of mechanisms 
Previous studies have taken various transmission channels as economic theories through 
which oil price may have an impact on economic indicators (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001; 
Brown and Yucel, 2002; Atukeren, 2003; Guo and Kliesen, 2005; Lescaroux and Mignon, 
2008; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Aliyu, 2009; Tang, Wu and Zhang, 2010). The most basic 
channels will be discussed in this study. Figure 3.2 illustrates these mechanisms. 
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Figure 3. 2: Transmission channels of oil price shocks 
Source: Tang, Wu and Zhang (2010) 
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producing countries. Notwithstanding the benefits, the instability in the oil price also 
adversely affects oil exporting countries. The uncertainty of oil prices makes it difficult to 
predict marginal cost of production for companies. Due to unstable cash flows, companies 
may limit job creation and investments ultimately harming economic growth. 
Demand: the shift in capital flows and purchasing power from importing to exporting 
economies of oil minimises consumer demand in the oil-importing nations whereas in the 
oil-exporting nations, consumer demand increases. 
Cost of living: a large number of goods undergo the production process of petroleum and 
agricultural products. Hence, a change in fuel or agricultural products directly affects such 
goods. Thus, higher prices of petroleum and agricultural products are likely to translate 
into other producer and consumer prices. Consumers dedicate more of their budget on the 
much higher petroleum and agricultural goods implying that they have less to spend on 
other products, ceteris paribus. The quantity demanded of these items seems comparatively 
unresponsive to price changes because of the nature of these basic commodities. For goods 
to be delivered and thus available in hubs, they have to be transported. The poorer 
households in the rural areas use paraffin and heavily rely on transported goods to their 
villages to be able to access the commodities they need. The wealthier households, on other 
hand, pay more money to fill their car tanks when purchasing petrol or diesel. Households’ 
cost of living evidently rises, their incomes buy less and their economic well-being 
diminishes. However, if the central bank does not practice seigniorage, this pass-through 
effect is minimised. As prices of other goods decline due to less demand of such goods, over 
the intermediate to long-term, the average rate of the price hike will equal the underlying 
inflation rate as determined by monetary policy. 
Unemployment: the tightened purchasing power and high cost of living may motivate 
workers to demand higher wages with the purpose of keeping up with inflation and 
protecting real incomes. If firms respond positively to these demands and the oil price 
proves to be persistent, a company may need to change its production structure with a 
possible result of people losing their jobs. 
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Investment: the producers later in the production, referred to as down-stream producers, 
as a result of the limited mark-up only absorb the cost increase by reducing their profit 
which leads to a decrease in their investments. As investment determines the potential 
output ability, which cannot recover in a short period of time even when the cost shock has 
disappeared, a decrease in investment would lessen output in the long run. Moreover, an 
oil price increase raises uncertainty about future oil prices and lack of investor confidence 
thereby clouding investments.  
Inflation: costs can be channelled from producers to end-users. The inflationary effects 
may leave the producers' profit rate slightly affected as firms tend to pass on their 
increased costs of production to consumers in the form of higher consumer prices thus 
reducing the consumers' real balance since consumption by households is affected 
indirectly through its positive relation with disposable income. 
Price and monetary transmission mechanism: the increased general price level as a 
result of an oil price hike reduces the real money in circulation. This may lead to a 
temporary increase in the real interest rate or the monetary authority could respond by 
increasing the money supply; however it is unlikely to implement the latter if it has to stick 
to a price stability rule or if the shock is recognised to be short-lived. 
Real balance: decreases in the value of the currency, as indicated in Arrow 9, can expand 
the demand for money in the market while investment decreases can narrow it. Therefore, 
net effects of oil price shocks on interest rate are unclear; neither does the corresponding 
monetary policy needed. Most monetary authorities set the target of their policy as 
controlling inflation and when the observed inflation is triggered by cost shocks such as oil-
price increases, a restrictive monetary policy can worsen the long-term output.  
3.3 Empirical literature 
Theoretical studies have investigated different channels through which oil prices affect 
economic indicators. While these studies provide important insights regarding the 
transmission of oil price changes, the practical relevance of the different theoretical 
channels is not ambiguous, given the lack of empirical evidence.  
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3.3.1 Empirical evidence for multiple country studies 
Abeysinghe (2001) measured the direct and indirect effects of oil prices on GDP growth of 
12 economies: ASEAN4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), NIE4 (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), China, Japan, USA and the rest of OECD as a group 
(ROECD) for the 1982Q1-2000Q2 period. The variables used were oil price and exchange 
rate with a structural VARX methodology. Findings indicate that net oil exporters such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia are negatively affected by high oil prices through indirect effects of 
a trade matrix. Results also show that the effect of oil price on growth is not of crucial 
importance for the U.S as a relatively large economy but is critical for small open 
economies.  
LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) conducted a study to evaluate the impact of oil price changes on 
inflation for the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan using an 
augmented Phillips curve framework. The variables utilised in this study include: inflation, 
interest rates, nominal oil price and unemployment rate of the period 1980 Q1-2001 Q4. 
The results of the econometric estimation suggested oil price increases to have a relatively 
fair effect on inflation in the United States, Japan and Europe.  
An oil price-macroeconomic relationship was investigated by Cunado and Gracia (2005) by 
means of studying the impact of oil price shocks on both economic activity and consumer 
price indexes for six Asian countries (Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Philippines) over the period 1975 Q1-2002 Q2. The variables employed are the 
inflation rates, exchange rate, real oil price levels and economic activity. The estimation 
strategy used was as follows: to check for Granger-causality, a short-term dynamic 
behaviour of oil prices and macroeconomic variables was done. A meaningful effect of oil 
prices on economic activity and price indexes was established in the short-run, the impact 
however was significantly greater when oil price shocks were expressed in local 
currencies. For some of the Asian countries, an imbalance of the oil price-macroeconomic 
relationship was evidenced. 
An empirical examination investigating the impact of real oil prices on real exchange rates 
of three main oil-exporting countries: Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia was carried by 
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Habib and Kalamova (2007).  The real effective exchange rates were used as a measure for 
Norway and Saudi Arabia (1980 Q1-2006 Q2) and Russia (1995 Q1-2006 Q2). A positive 
long-run connection between the real oil price and the real exchange rate is established for 
Russia; while this relationship is not found for Norway and Saudi Arabia. The diversity in 
exchange rate regimes could not assist in explaining the distinct empirical results found on 
the impact of oil prices across countries. This may be attributable to other policy responses, 
through the accumulation of net foreign assets and their sterilisation and specific 
institutional characteristics.  
Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2008) analysed the influence of oil price shocks on oil-producing 
and oil-consuming countries. Particularly, Russia and its 8 major trading partners 
(Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, China, USA, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Finland). 
Quarterly data from 1995Q3-2006Q3 was employed in the VAR model. It was found that 
Russia and Canada as oil producers benefit from oil price shocks where a price increase of 
50% boosts Russian GDP by 12%. However, the oil producers are negatively affected 
indirectly as the economic activity of their export countries deteriorate. Those countries 
that generally trade more with oil producing countries indirectly benefit from oil-
producing countries through higher demand of products. A substantial amount of negative 
effects from oil prise rise are found in China, USA and Japan while the European countries 
perform well during positive oil-price shocks. 
In a study by Cologni and Manera (2008) to explore the consequence of positive oil prices 
on output, prices and monetary variables for the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), it was found that for the majority 
of the countries examined, oil price shocks have an unexpected impact on interest rates 
proposing a restrictive monetary policy stance directed at fighting inflation. The variables 
used in the structural cointegrated VAR model included short-term interest rates (treasury 
bills/lending rates), monetary aggregate (M1), CPI, RGDP, world price of oil as well as the 
exchange rate for the quarterly data ranging between 1980 (1)-2003 (4). 
Upon investigating the link of oil prices and different macroeconomic and financial 
variables (GDP, CPI, household consumption, unemployment rate and share prices) for 
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three groups of countries: OPEC, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries; Lescaroux and 
Mignon (2008) found in the short run the existence of various connections between oil 
prices and macroeconomic variables more especially between oil and share prices. 
Similarly, numerous long-term relationships were discovered in the long-run. The causality 
generally runs from oil prices to the other variables. VAR processes for annual data of 
1960-2005 were employed in this study.  
Using quarterly data of 1971:1-2008:1 for the United States and Canada, 1975:1-2008:1 for 
the United Kingdom, DePratto, Resende and Maier (2009) examined how changes in the 
prices of oil affect the macroeconomy for these economies. The study employed a new 
Keynesian General Equilibrium open economy model where oil prices were perceived to 
have affected the economy primarily through the supply side as the demand side effects 
were not found. Temporary negative effects, resulting from higher oil prices, on output gap 
and trend growth were observed leading to a permanent shrink in the level of potential and 
actual output.  
Alvarez, Hurtado, Sanchez and Thomas (2009) assessed the fluctuations in the price of oil 
and its impact on consumer price inflation of Spain and Euro area. The inflationary effect of 
oil price changes is rather limited, nonetheless, crude oil price variations account for much 
inflation variability. The impact is higher in Spain than in the Euro area. The study period is 
quarterly starting from 1997: Q1-2007: Q4. The DSGE models were employed where CPI 
inflation, growth rates of real GDP, real private consumption, real private investment, 
employment in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, real wages,  total real exports, the 
euro nominal interest rates and the dollar nominal interest rates were used as variables. 
An estimate VAR-5 model was undertaken by Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011) to review the 
influence of oil price shocks on the major oil-exporting countries in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya and Nigeria. Yearly data covering a period of 1970-2006 was extracted for five 
macroeconomic variables namely CPI inflation, GDP deflator inflation, real GDP growth 
rate, industrial value-added growth rate and gross fixed capital formation growth rate. 
Only a small impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables was present in the 
short-run. Results of the impulse response functions reveal oil price shocks to have 
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prompted volatile and negative responses of macroeconomic variables. Oil prices should 
provide increased foreign exchange earnings and government revenue for these countries 
however; such increases were not transmitted into improving economic indicators. 
The role of oil prices in explaining the dynamics of selected emerging countries exchange 
rates for the 03/01/2003 - 02/06/2010 daily period was explored with the use of the VAR 
method. The emerging economies reviewed included Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and 
Turkey. Turhan, Hacihasanoglu and Soytas (2012) findings showed that the influence of oil 
prices changed significantly in the sample period under review. The relation between oil 
prices and exchange rates became more relevant after the 2008 financial crisis. A 
conclusion is drawn that a rise in oil price results to a significant appreciation in emerging 
currencies against the US Dollar.  
The role of oil shocks on Euro-area macroeconomic variables was determined by 
estimating a new-Keynesian small open economy model with Bayesian methods. Forni, 
Gerali and Notarpietro (2012) utilised quarterly Euro area data for the period 1995: Q1-
2007: Q4 to estimate the model. Twenty variables were included in the model. For the Euro 
area (employment, government consumption, real exchange rate, GDP, consumption, 
investment, the HICP deflator, GDP deflator, investment deflator, wage, exports, imports, 
fuel, the deflator of the ex-fuel component of HICP, the short term interest rate), the rest of 
the world (aggregate demand, consumption deflator, short term interest rate) and the 
international oil market (crude oil price and oil supply). The impact depends on the reason 
or origin of variation. When the increase is accounted to world’s aggregate demand, the 
Euro-area GDP and CPI inflation increase. When the increase in oil is due to negative oil 
supply shocks against positive world oil demand shocks, stagflationary effects in the region 
are felt. However, the 2004-2008 oil price increases did not instigate stagflationary effects 
on the Euro-area economy since it was associated with positive aggregate demand shocks 
in the rest of the world. The diminished world total demand for oil explained the 2008 
concurrent drop in oil prices, the Euro area GDP and inflation (notably its fuel constituent). 
33 
 
3.3.2 Empirical evidence for single country studies 
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001) examined fluctuations in the oil price and its impact thereof on 
seven macroeconomic variables: oil price, oil revenue, government development 
expenditure, government current expenditure, consumer price index, money supply and 
imports. The VAR and the VECM estimation models were both used for a quarterly data of 
1984:1-19989:4 of the Kuwaiti economy. Oil price shocks (and the resulting revenues) 
have a notable impact on government expenditure, both development and current. 
However, government development expenditure has been influenced relatively more. CPI 
significantly explains variations of both types of government expenditures while variations 
in the value of imports are mostly accounted for by oil revenue fluctuations followed by the 
government development expenditures. A significant part of money supply variance is 
explained by the variance in oil revenue.  
The VAR approach analysing relationships among oil prices, real stock prices, interest 
rates, real economic activity and employment in Greece was implemented by Papapetrou 
(2001) for the 1989:1-1999:6 monthly period. An indication from the empirical evidence is 
that oil price changes affect real economic activity and employment, oil prices are 
important in explaining stock prices and stock returns do not result to changes in real 
activity and employment. 
Atukeren (2003) examined the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in Switzerland for 
a quarterly time interval of 1980-2002. The estimation results from the macroeconomic 
model suggested that a large increase in oil price affects Swiss by just a small decline in its 
real GDP. There is no persistence transmission from oil price to core inflation. An adverse 
relationship between oil price and Swiss exports is observed. Lastly, increases in the oil 
price reduce Swiss imports and as a result lessening the overall impact of such increases on 
real GDP growth. 
Hamilton and Herrera (2004) carried a study challenging conclusions drawn from 
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) that monetary policy could be used to eliminate any 
recessionary consequences of an oil price shock. Having employed a longer lag length of the 
VAR, evidence showed that even restrictive policies by the Federal Reserve would not have 
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succeeded in preventing historical downturns. The sample period used in the study was 
monthly from 1965:1 to 1995:12 and the variables were the Federal funds rate, short and 
long rate.  
Olomola (2006) studied effects of oil price shocks on output, inflation, real exchange rate 
and money supply in Nigeria using quarterly data from 1970-2003. A VAR-5 model 
employed composed of five variables, namely: real Gross Domestic Product (real GDP), CPI, 
real exchange rate, money supply and real oil price. Oil price shock did not affect output 
and inflation but significantly affected real exchange rates and in the long run money 
supply. 
Kilian (2008) carried a study to explore energy price shocks effects on the United States 
economy by employing the VAR economic model for the 1973 February - 2002 December 
period. Oil price increases were not identified to have been driven by exogenous crude oil 
supply shocks but by strong global demand for industrial commodities and expectations 
shifts resulting to an increase in precautionary demand for crude oil.  
For the Turkish economy, Ozturk, Feridun and Kalyoncu (2008) evaluated if a link between 
international oil prices and the exchange rate existed. Using monthly data for the period 
1982:12-2006:05, the Granger-causality test results suggested a causality relation between 
the variables where the USD/YTL real exchange rate was found to be Granger-caused by 
the international real crude oil prices.  
Coudert, Mignon and Penot (2008) using monthly data from January 1974 - November 
2004 investigated a stable long-run relationship between oil prices and the United States 
effective exchange rate. Applying the VECM estimation model, results of Granger-causality 
showed a one-sided causality between oil prices to exchange rates. The authors claim that 
the link between the variables is channeled through the net foreign asset position. 
Eryigit (2009) carried a study where an extended market model with market return, oil 
prices and the Turkish exchange rate was used to evaluate the impact of the oil price 
changes on market indexes in Istanbul Stock Exchange for the daily time span of 
2000.01.04 - 2008.01.11. Statistically significant effects of oil price changes on electricity, 
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wholesale and retail trade, insurance, holding, investment, wood, paper printing, basic 
metal products, machinery and non metal and mineral products indices at the 5% 
significance level of significance were reported. Oil price changes also have a significant 
positive effect on wood, paper and printing, insurance and electricity sub-sector indices. 
Tang, Wu and Zhang (2009) carried a study which aimed at measuring the adverse 
economic impacts of oil price shocks in China during the months of February 1998 - August 
2008. The structural VAR model contained the following variables: consumer and producer 
price index, the real oil price, real rate of return for industrial companies, real interest rate, 
real investment towards industry and real industrial added value. The oil price increases 
are found to have inversely affected output and investment. A positive relation where oil 
price increase (or decrease), inflation and interest rates increase (or decrease) existed.  
In an empirical assessment by Aliyu (2009), monthly data of 1980:M1-2007:M12 checking 
for the potential robustness of oil price shocks on real macroeconomic activity in Nigeria 
was utilised. With the use of the VAR processes, evidence of linear and non-linear effects of 
oil price shocks on real GDP were established. Oil prices and real GDP growth are positively 
correlated but increases are larger in magnitude than the decreases. Results of the Wald 
and Granger-causality tests indicate that oil price coefficients in linear and asymmetric 
specifications are statistically significant and that linear price change and all the other oil 
price transformations are significant.  
Examining the price-relationship between the primary agricultural commodities, exchange 
rates and oil prices in the United States; Harri, Nalley and Hudson (2009) found a 
connection linking commodity prices (corn, cotton and soybeans but not for wheat) to oil 
and the exchange rates play a role in the linkage of prices over time. Monthly data from 
January 2000 - September 2008 was used in the VAR econometric model for this study.  
Research work by Kumar (2009) assessed the oil price-macroeconomy relationship for the 
Indian economy over the 1975Q1-2004Q3 quarterly period. In the VAR model, Granger-
causality test results propose oil prices to Granger-cause macroeconomic activities. The 
growth of industrial production is inversely affected by shocks in the oil price where a 
100% increase in oil prices declines the growth of industrial production by 1%. Other than 
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the variable itself, the oil shocks and monetary shocks explain most of variations in 
industrial production growth.  
Du, He and Wei (2010) carried a study to investigate the relationship between the world oil 
price and China’s macro-economy based on a monthly time series from 1995:1-2008:12. 
The study made use of five endogenous variables including real gross domestic product 
(GDP), inflation (CPI), real oil price (O), money supply (M1) and interest rates (R). While 
China’s macroeconomy fails to Granger-cause world prices, the results of the VAR model 
demonstrate that GDP and CPI move with oil prices in the same direction. 
Incorporating an efficiency wage model for equilibrium employment, Dogrul and Soytas 
(2010) examined the connection between oil prices, unemployment rate and real interest 
rates in Turkey for the period 2005:01-2009:08. The Toda-Yamamoto procedure was 
applied to test for a long run Granger-causality. From such results, it is clear that real oil 
price and interest rates enhance predictions of unemployment in the long-run. The authors 
argue that this finding is in line with the hypothesis that labour is a substitute factor of 
production for capital and energy. 
An analysis focused on Pakistan measured the potential effects of oil price fluctuations and 
other macroeconomic variables (government expenditures, average exchange rates, 
consumption, inflation, domestic investment and foreign direct investment) on Gross 
Domestic Product was carried by Syed (2010). The study is based upon annual data where 
data for exchange rate is average. For the time span of 1979-2009, the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation technique and Error Correction Model were applied. The 
negative relationship found between oil price and GDP is an indication that when oil prices 
increase, the general wellbeing of households decline. A negative relationship was also 
seen between inflation and GDP while government expenditures, consumption, average 
exchange rates, investment and foreign direct investment have positive and direct effects 
on GDP. 
Ito (2010) empirically examined the robustness of oil prices on the macroeconomic 
variables in Russia using the VAR model for the 1994: Q1 to 2009:Q3 time interval. In the 
short-run of 8 quarters, oil price rises arouse the inflation rate and in the long-run, a 1% 
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rise (or fall) in the oil price contributes to the weakening (or strengthening) of the 
exchange rate by 0.17% and declines GDP growth by 0.46%. 
Reicher and Utlaut (2010) carried a study with the purpose of assessing the relation 
between oil prices and long-term interest rates in the United States for the quarterly period 
1955(I) - 2009 (III). Variables put in place included: the change in real oil price, the change 
in long-run nominal interest rates, the change in log productivity, the civilian 
unemployment rate, the log nonfinancial corporate labour share, the Fed funds rate less the 
long run nominal interest rate and the PCE inflation rate. A strong association between oil 
prices and long-term nominal interest rates was established and this association existed for 
the whole post-war period. Predictions of a vigorous relationship between inflation and oil 
were also observed. 
A link of consumer price index and fuel oil price index in Turkey was assessed in the time 
interval monthly data of 2005:1-2009:12 using VECM by Celik and Akgul (2011). A 1% 
increase in fuel oil prices induced the consumer price index to rise by 1.26% about a year 
later. Moreover, a unidirectional Granger-causality was noted from the fuel oil price to the 
consumer price index. 
Using VECM, the magnitude of oil price fluctuations on Algerian five macroeconomic 
variables was determined by Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud (2012). The variables used are as 
follows: unemployment, real GDP, inflation rate, real oil price, money supply and real 
effective exchange rate. The period covered by the series is from 1980-2011. In the short-
run, the only variables oil prices have notable effects on are inflation (positive) and real 
effective exchange rate (negative) but in the long-run, even other variables such as the real 
GDP and unemployment are positively and negatively affected by variations in the oil price 
respectively, with the exception of money supply where no important effects were 
detected. 
Hussin, Muhammad and Razak (2012) carried a study to analyse the robustness of oil price 
and macroeconomic variable changes on Islamic Stock Market in Malaysia. The data is 
monthly and the period under review commenced from January 2007 - December 2011. An 
estimation of the VAR method was employed. The variables included crude oil price, 
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foreign exchange rates of Ringgit Malaysia-United States Dollar and FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
Emas Shariah Index. There is a positive and significant relationship between the Islamic 
Stock Price and the oil price but an inverse and insignificant relationship of the Islamic 
Stock Price and the exchange rate is marked.  
The IS-MP model evaluating the possible effects of macroeconomic variables and crude oil 
prices on real GDP for Indonesia was applied by Hsing (2012). The sample ranges from 
2000: Q1-2010: Q1.  Increased stock prices, oil prices, appreciation of the Rupiah and a fall 
in the inflation rate and federal funds rate boost Indonesia’s GDP whereas a higher budget 
deficit does not help increase output. The conclusion drawn is that Indonesia’s GDP does 
not deteriorate because of higher oil prices. 
A case study of the Unites States to investigate an association of the real interest rates and 
the real oil price was conducted on monthly data of the time frame 1975M01-2012M05. 
The variables included in the model were as follows: the OECD index of industrial 
production, several measures of the real interest rate, effective real exchange rate and the 
real price of oil. Using the VAR estimation method, the study by Arora and Tanner (2013) 
shows that the real oil price responds negatively to unexpected variations in real interest 
rates. However, the impact largely depends on specific characteristics (such as the measure 
or the calculation) of real interest rates and the period of the sample. The oil price 
continuously declines against unanticipated increases in short-term interest rates 
throughout the sample reviewed. 
3.3.3 Empirical evidence for South Africa 
A case study of South Africa by Swanepoel (2006) provided empirical evidence on the pass-
through of external shocks (oil price, exchange rate and import price shocks) on inflation at 
different price stages (import prices, producer prices and consumer prices). The VAR 
analysis is based on quarterly data of 1991:Q1-2004:Q2. Whilst the speed of pass-through 
is fastest for non-oil import price shocks, followed by exchange rate shocks and oil price 
shocks; the pass-through is largest for exchange rate shocks. External factors explain a 
modest fraction of the variance of non-oil import prices and consumer prices but between 
20 and 50% of the variance of manufacturing producer prices. Among the external factors 
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exchange rate shocks are the most important, followed by oil price shocks and non-oil 
import price shocks. 
Applying an input-output model and a household survey for South Africa (particularly the 
macro-economic, meso-economic and the micro-economic or household model); Fofana, 
Chitiga and Mabugu (2009) identified the channels by which South Africa and its people are 
affected by increases in the oil price. The macroeconomic variables used included GDP, 
exchange rate, inflation and employment for a 5 year horizon of 2001-2006. The results of 
the analysis revealed the macroeconomic variables to have been impacted negatively with 
GDP falling and the current account balance worsening. The resulting paraffin price hikes 
from an oil price rise and the increased cost of living thereof affects poor households in the 
rural areas, the black population in particular, much higher than the corresponding quintile 
groups while an increase of transport fuel hits the richer households much harder. The 
magnitude of rising transport costs show that median quintile expenditure groups observe 
the highest impact both in urban and rural areas and especially among the black 
population. 
The oil supply and demand shocks on the South African economy were measured by 
Chisadza, Dlamini, Gupta and Modise (2013). The estimated structural VAR-7 model of 
1975:01-2011:02 quarterly data was employed. The variables included in the model for the 
global oil market included: crude oil price, global oil production and global real economic 
activity where as the macroeconomic variables included the real effective exchange rate, 
real GDP, the consumer price index and the interest rate. Oil supply disruptions had an 
important positive effect on inflation with no response from the monetary policy and the 
effect proved to be short-lived. The effect was statistically insignificant on other variables. 
A demand shock resulted from short-to-long term enhancement in the output and real 
exchange rate while the effect was insignificant for inflation and monetary policy. The 
inflation and real exchange rate is inversely affected by oil-specific demand shocks, while 
output is positively related to unanticipated changes in oil price due to speculations. 
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3.4 Assessment of literature 
Based on the literature reviewed, it is generally concluded that there is no uniformity of the 
relationship between oil prices and economic indicators. The results were also not 
consistent in terms of the most applicable models within an economy. In terms of evidence, 
the findings from the previous studies vary depending on the country’s economic well-
being and methodology used in the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the econometric model to test the impact of oil prices on selected 
economic indicators in South Africa. Specifically, areas to be covered include model 
specification; definition of variables, apriori expectations, data sources and finally empirical 
techniques to be employed will be discussed in detail concluding the chapter. 
4.2 Model specification 
The model and the five variables of interest, whose choice is mainly driven by similar 
studies such as those of Olomola (2006) and Du, He and Wei (2010) is constructed below. 
uOilEIEI ptt  1 ………………………………………………………………………….………………………. (1) 
uEIOilOil ptt  1 …………………………………………………………………………………………………. (2) 
where tEI = economic indicators entailing exchange, inflation,  interest rate and Gross Domestic Product;  
pOil  = the price of oil and 
u is the error term capturing any other factors not accounted by the model which may affect the variables. 
The model above reflects tEI  as a series affected by current and past values of tOil  and, 
simultaneously, tOil  to be a series that is affected by current and past values of the tEI  
series. 
4.3 Definition of variables and apriori expectations 
The rationale for using the selected variables is that monetary policy is an important part 
of macroeconomic stability (Roberts, 1997).  In line with this view, Wakeford (2006) points 
out that the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) interest and exchange rate policies 
effectively set the macroeconomic framework while LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) believe the 
perception that monetary policy works more efficiently by virtue of interest rates is 
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conventional and it ignores other policy channels. In consideration of the latter view, the 
current study relaxes this assumption by also including exchange rate, inflation rate and 
Gross Domestic Product instead of just the interest rate as has been the case in previous 
literature (Reicher and Utlaut, 2010). Below are individual definitions of these variables. 
Oil price: the Brent crude is priced in US Dollars per barrel because of the Dollar’s role as 
the main international currency. Most of international products, like natural resource and 
agricultural products are expressed in Dollars (Humpage and Mowry, 2011). According to 
ECB (2010) producers have no market power to set prices in their own currency. The 
Dollars dominance as means of payment in global oil markets is that, as it is argued, the US 
was the first oil producer and remained the largest world oil producer until it was 
overtaken by the Middle East in the 1950s. To date, prices of oil are priced in US Dollars. To 
avoid multicollinearity in the model, oil prices were not converted to the South African 
Rand but rather were left to be original as measured in US Dollar. 
Exchange rate: as Brent crude oil is paid for in US Dollars, South Africa spends a great deal 
of foreign exchange to purchase this commodity. The foreign exchange rate in this study 
involves the South African cent per US Dollar but this has been converted from South 
African cents to South African Rand dividing each rate by 100. A negative relationship is 
expected between the exchange rate and oil price. When oil prices go up, the value of the 
South African Rand drops and when oil prices decrease, the Rand strengthens. Humpage 
and Mowry (2011) highlights that a weakening of the Dollar declines prices of international 
trade thereby shifting world demand towards foreign currency The reverse for this is also 
true.  
Inflation rate: inflation is a continuing rise in the average level of prices. There are various 
measures of inflation such as the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) deflator. However Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a change in prices of a 
range of consumer products is a proxy put in place to measure the rate of inflation in South 
Africa. Wakeford (2006) highlights that SARB regards oil price movements to be one of its 
major threats to maintain its inflation target. A positive relationship is therefore expected 
between inflation rate and oil price. 
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Interest rates: the repurchase transaction, the ‘repo system’, which will be employed in 
this study, is a type of a short-term interest rate that represents the cost at which SARB 
lends money to commercial banks. Since the adoption of the inflation targeting policy in 
2000, as the anchor of monetary policy, SARB uses the repo rate as its policy instrument to 
maintain the level of inflation within the chosen interval of 3-6% (Bonga-Bonga and 
Kabundi, 2009). By using the repo rate, SARB directly controls money in circulation. Robert 
(1997) highlights that “the focus of monetary policy on inflation is not only based on the 
Reserve Bank’s mission to protect the value of the Rand but also to direct interest rates to 
control money-supply growth”. If there is excess money growth in the market, SARB 
increases the repo rate to create a decrease. In turn, the commercial banks react to this 
contractionary monetary policy by increasing lending and prime rates. This results in a 
decrease of money-demand whereas to encourage domestic savings, interest rates have to 
be higher than current and expected inflation (SARB, 2012). 
Domestic interest rates in South Africa, as the country has a small open economy, are 
affected by events in other countries. If oil prices increase, mainly due to exogenous factors 
as discussed in chapter 1, the repo rate also increases therefore a positive relationship is 
expected between interest rates and oil prices.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): as the most commonly used measure of economic growth 
in South Africa (Fofana, Chitiga and Mabugu, 2009; Ghalayini 2011; Chisadza, Dlamini, 
Gupta and Modise, 2013), the study makes use of GDP at constant 2005 prices measured in 
million Rand to see the sensitiveness of the overall economy to oil prices. Suleiman (2013) 
states that GDP rates over time are a useful indicator to measure economic output. A 
negative relationship between oil price and GDP is expected. When oil prices increase, GDP 
decreases. Gonzalez and Nabiyev (2009) bivariate results found a negative correlation for 
the US between GDP and oil price increases.  
4.4 Data sources 
The study is based on secondary data of 22 years with data frequency being quarterly for 
the period 1990:Q1 to 2012:Q4, giving 88 observations. Except for GDP which was already 
available on quarterly basis, data for all other variables were transformed from monthly to 
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quarterly (average) using the Eviews 8 Economic software. A quarterly series is preferred 
as it increases the data points and provides greater degrees of freedom (Akpan, 2007). Due 
to the different unit of measures of the data where oil price is denominated in US Dollars, 
exchange rate in Rand, inflation and interest rate in percentage and GDP in million Rand, a 
log transformation on the data will be applied to bring all variables to an equal measure. 
Furthermore, the data for all variables of the period under review has been extracted from 
the SARB website.  
4.5 Estimation technique 
The following section sets forth the methods of regression analysis, estimation technique 
and assessment of statistical significance. Thereafter, an outline of how to interpret the 
results of regression analysis is discussed.  
4.5.1 Testing for order of integration 
To avoid spurious results, where there is no relationship between variables but wrongly 
conclude from a regression analysis that there is such a relationship, a test for the order of 
integration for the number of unit roots will be carried (Gujarati, 2004). This assesses 
whether a time series is stationary or not and integrated of a particular order. In the 
absence of carrying such tests and differencing where necessary, the estimated regression 
coefficients may be misleading as to whether there is a relationship between the variables.  
Thus, to assess the order of integration of each of the variables, the study makes use of two 
main aspects of unit root tests: the informal and the formal analysis. 
4.5.1.1 Informal presentation of the series 
Graphical illustrations are used to get a rough idea of a time series. The graphs of all the 
time series will be shown to ascertain the properties of the series overtime. Three possible 
outcomes as cited by Asteriou and Hall (2007) are: 
a. Stationary AR (1) model 
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The statistical properties of the time series such as the mean, variance and autocorrelation 
do not change overtime. 
b. An exploding AR(1) model 
Non-linear trends can occur in the form of increasing or decreasing trend.  
c. A non-stationary AR (1) model 
The series is non-stationary if it is increasing upward or downward overtime. In this study, 
it is preferred to work with stationary data. As specified by Mahadeva and Robinson (2004) 
“stationarity is important for estimation: applying regressions on non-stationary variables 
can give misleading parameter estimates of the relationships between variables”. Checking 
for stationarity is also important for forecasting: it tells about the nature of processes 
needed to be built into a model in order to make accurate predictions (Diebold and Kilian, 
1999). A non-stationary series will be differenced once or more. The number of times d that 
an integrated process must be differenced to become stationary is said to be the order of 
integrated process (Hill, Griffiths and Judge, 1997).  
4.5.1.2 Formal unit root tests 
The conclusions above are more based on a visual impression rather than formal or official 
testing methods, which are considered below. For robustness check, two different formal 
tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests will be considered. These 
are discussed in greater detail next.  
4.5.1.2.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
Brooks (2008) discusses that the work on testing for a unit root in time series was 
introduced by Dickey and Fuller (Fuller, 1976; Dickey and Fuller, 1979) in which “The basic 
objective of the test is to examine the null hypothesis that 1  in  
ttt uyy  1 ..................................................................................................................................................... (3) 
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against the one-sided alternative .1  Thus the hypotheses of interest are :0H  series 
contains a unit root versus :1H  series is stationary”. 
According to Brooks (2008) “the tests are valid only if tu  is white noise. In particular, tu  is 
assumed not to be autocorrelated, but would be so if there was autocorrelation in the 
dependent variable of the regression ( ty ) which has not been modelled. If this is the case, 
the test would be ‘oversized’, meaning that the true size of the test (the proportion of times 
a correct null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected) would be higher than the nominal size 
used (e.g. 5%). Comparing the Dickey-Fuller (DF) critical values with the standard normal 
critical values, it can be seen that the DF critical values are much bigger in absolute terms 
(i.e. more negative). The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour of the stationary 
alternative in each case if the test statistic is more negative than the critical value”.  
It is for this reason and because “the error term is unlikely to be white noise that Dickey 
and Fuller (1981) extended their procedure suggesting an augmented version of the test 
which includes extra lagged terms of the dependent variable (i.e. a set of additional test 
statistics and their critical values for joint tests of the significance of the lagged y, and the 
constant and trend terms) in order to eliminate autocorrelation. The lag length on these 
extra terms is either determined by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), or more usefully by the lag length necessary to whiten the 
residuals. The solution to augment the test using p lags of the dependent variable is 
written: 
tt
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1  .............................................................................................. (4) 
The lags of ty  now soak up any dynamic structure present in the dependent variable, to 
ensure that tu is not autocorrelated” (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
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4.5.1.2.2 The Phillips-Perron test 
Asteriou and Hall (2007) describes that “Phillips and Perron (1988) have developed a more 
comprehensive theory of unit root non-stationarity. The tests are similar to ADF tests, but 
they incorporate an automatic correction to the DF procedure to allow for autocorrelated 
residuals. The distribution theory supporting the Dickey-Fuller tests is based on the 
assumption that the error terms are statistically independent and have a constant variance. 
So, when using the ADF methodology we have to make sure that the error terms are 
uncorrelated and that they really have a constant variance. The test regression for the PP 
test is the AR (1) process: 
ttt eyy   101  ............................................................................................................................. (5) 
While the ADF test corrects for higher order serial correlation by adding lagged differenced 
terms on the right-hand side, the PP test makes a correlation to the t-statistic of the 
coefficient y from the AR (1) regression to account for the serial correlation in et. So, the PP 
statistics are just modifications of the ADF t-statistics that take into account the less 
restrictive nature of the error process”.  
After having confirmed the order of integration and depending on the results of the unit 
root tests, the next analysis to be conducted will be the Vector Auto-regression (VAR) 
estimate where an assumption of no cointegration amongst the variables is made. The VAR 
model is employed because of the nature of data for this study and the transmission 
mechanisms thereof as the dependent and the independent variables cannot, at this stage, 
be distinguished. Also, the study focuses more on the results of the impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions than on the VAR results and this is possible when 
the VAR methodology is used. Considering the assumption of no cointegration, VAR at first 
differences will be carried. 
4.5.2 The Vector Autoregressive method 
Based on Mello and Nell (2001), “the problem of simultaneous bias is often present in a 
structural system because this specification expresses each endogenous variable as a 
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separate function of other endogenous variables, alongside predetermined variables. Since 
the endogenous variables are correlated with the error terms, the structural coefficients 
cannot be consistently estimated by OLS. This problem can be removed if the structural 
equations are solved for the existing endogenous variables, making them dependent solely 
on predetermined variables and stochastic disturbances”. Under these conditions, the 
current study employs the VAR model. 
The VAR model is a multi-equation system where all the variables are treated as 
endogenous. There is thus one equation for each variable as dependent variable. Each 
equation has lagged values of all the included variables as dependent variables, including 
the dependent variable itself (Mello and Nell, 2001). Thus all the equations have the same 
form since they share the same right-hand side variables.  
The development of VAR models was the result of Sims (1980) that if there is simultaneity 
among a number of variables, then all these variables should be treated in the same way. 
There should be no distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables. This is 
referred to as the reduced form VAR. There are two types of VAR models, a structural (first-
order) and a standard (or reduced form) VAR. An example of the former is a time series 
shown on equation 1 and 2 where tEI has a contemporaneous impact on tOil and tOil has a 
contemporaneous impact on tEI . 
The VAR model has emerged as one of the principal applications utilised in the analysis of 
the dynamic economic systems, especially in studying the correlation between oil price 
shocks and macroeconomy (Brown and Yucel, 2002; Jones, Leiby and Paik, 2004). 
Forecasts obtained from VAR models are in most cases more accurate as compared to those 
obtained from complex simultaneous equation models (Mahmoud, 1984; McNees, 1986).  
A VAR model has drawbacks as is applicable to other model classes - it is an atheoretical 
model, sensitive to the lag selection and have a dimensionality problem. VARs are 
atheoretical since they use less or no theoretical base about relationships between 
variables to guide the specification of the model (Gujarati, 2004). Notwithstanding this 
critic, empirically, the observed time series movements are often related with each other 
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whereby oil prices might be an important variable for selected economic indicators, which 
on the other hand may have an effect on oil. 
VARs are sensitive to lag length criteria such that a model will be misspecified if the lag 
length is too small and is over parameterised if the number of lags is too large 
(Kalyanaraman and Tuwajri, 2014). A maximum lag would also reduce the degrees of 
freedom for estimation (Eltony and Al-Awai, 2001). However; there are several approaches 
available for dealing with this issue. These include the Likelihood Ratio test (LR), Final 
Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). The appropriate lag length to be used 
in this study will be one which is sufficient to capture dynamics in the changes of variables. 
The reduction in the number of parameters (that is, imposing zero or other restrictions on 
some of them) will improve forecast accuracy provided the reduced model still describes 
the data adequately (Armstrong, 2001). Moreover, good results of misspecification tests 
which will be conducted will ensure that the parameter reductions are acceptable. 
Therefore such critics are not of concern for this study. 
The current study focuses on the reduced form VAR because when there is no certainty 
that a variable is really exogenous, each variable has to be treated symmetrically. The 
following VAR model of order p, as has been recognised by Du et al. 2010, is considered: 
tit
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………. (6)
 
Where '2,1 )...( ntttt yyyy   is a n x 1 vector of endogenous variables, while 1ty  is the 
corresponding lag terms of order i.  is the n x n matrix of autoregressive coefficients of 
vector 1ty for 
'
21 ),...,(.,...,2,1 nccccpi  is the n x 1 intercept vector of the VAR model. 
'
21 ),...,( ntttt    is the n x 1 vector of White Noise Process to accommodate other factors 
affecting the oil price but which have not been captured by the model above.  
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The three main types of analysis to be performed using the VAR model in this study include 
(1) impulse response functions; (2) variance decompositions and (3) Granger-causality 
tests. These are discussed in greater detail next. 
4.5.2.1 The impulse response function 
The information on the size and the speed of the transmittable of external shocks on 
different price indices is obtained from impulse response functions. The impulse response 
function weights the response of the dependent variable in the VAR to shocks in the error 
terms (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). The study will assess the reaction of each economic 
indicator in response to an oil price change. 
4.5.2.2 The variance decomposition 
The variance decomposition measures how much of the forecast error variance of each of 
the variables can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables (Seymen, 2008). 
The problem of forecasting future oil price is confounded due to its volatile behaviour 
(Yang, Hwang and Huang, 2002). Therefore, the variance decomposition is computed to 
capture the relative importance of external shocks in explaining fluctuations in the price 
indices (Swanepoel, 2006). In the context of this study, the focus on variance 
decomposition is to see how many of the unanticipated changes of economic indicators are 
explained by each type of different oil price shocks. 
4.5.2.3 Granger-causality tests 
Asteriou and Hall (2007) explains that causality refers to the ability of one variable to 
predict (and therefore cause) the other. Granger (1969) developed a test that defined 
causality as follows: a variable ty is said to Granger-cause tx , if tx can be predicted with 
greater accuracy by using past values of the ty variable rather than not using such past 
values, ceteris paribus. Suppose two variables, ty and tx , affect each other with distributed 
lags. The Granger-causality test for the case of two stationary variables ty and tx involves as 
a first step the estimation of the following VAR model: 
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where it is assumed that both yt  and xt  are uncorrelated white-noise error terms in 
which it is possible to have that (a) tx  causes ty  (b) ty causes tx  (c) there is a bi-directional 
feedback (causality among variables), and finally (d) the two variables are independent. 
These cases are discussed in detail below. 
Case 1: The lagged x terms in (7) may be statistically different from zero as a group, 
and the lagged y terms in (8) not statistically different from zero. In this case, 
tx  causes ty .  
Case 2: The lagged y terms in (8) may be statistically different from zero as a group, 
and the lagged x terms in (7) not statistically different from zero. In this case, 
ty  causes tx .    
Case 3: Both sets of x and y terms are statistically different from zero in (7) and (8), 
so that there is a bi-directional causality. 
Case 4: Both sets of x and y terms are not statistically different from zero in (7) and 
(8), so that tx  is independent of ty . 
The Granger-causality test, then, involves the following procedure. First, to estimate the 
VAR model given in equations (7) and (8). Then check the significance of the coefficients 
and apply variable deletion tests first in the lagged x terms for equation (7), and then in the 
lagged y terms in equation (8). According to the result of the variable deletion tests it may 
be concluded about the direction of causality based upon the four cases mentioned above. 
4.5.3 Diagnostic checks 
The diagnostic tests are constructed to ascertain that no regression misspecifications exist. 
The tests are based on the calculation of a test statistic and are constructed in several ways. 
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The precise approach to constructing the test statistic will determine the distribution that 
the test statistic is assumed to follow (Mishi, 2012). Three particular approaches in 
common usage:  AR roots, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and white heteroscedasticity will 
be carried and their results are to be given by the Eviews 8 econometric package.  
4.5.3.1 AR Roots 
The VAR will be tested for AR Roots whose results of the estimated VAR are to be regarded 
as stable (or stationary) if all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. 
If not, the impulse response standard errors will not be valid (Mishi, 2012).  
4.5.3.2 Autocorrelation LM test 
In accordance with Brooks (2008) if the errors are not uncorrelated with one another, it 
would be stated that they are autocorrelated or that they are serially correlated. The LM 
test statistics in the context of the diagnostic tests presented here follow a x2 distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions placed on the model, and 
denoted m. The LM test centres around the value of R2 for an auxiliary regression. If one or 
more coefficients in an auxiliary regression are statistically significant, the value of R2 for 
that equation will be relatively high, while if none of the variables is significant, R2 will be 
relatively low. The LM test would thus operate by obtaining R2 from the auxiliary 
regression and multiplying it by the number of observations, T. The test is one of the joint 
null hypothesis. For the LM test, if the x2 - test statistic is greater than the corresponding 
value from the statistical table then reject the null hypothesis that the errors are 
homoscedastic. 
4.5.3.3 White heteroscedasticity test 
In relation to Brooks (2008), if the errors do not have a constant variance, they are said to 
be heteroscedastic. There are a number of formal statistical tests for heteroscedasticity. A 
popular test is White’s (1980) general test for heteroscedasticity. The test detects 
heteroscedasticity to sharpen the inferences from the test and to increase its power. It is 
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particularly useful because it makes few assumptions about the likely form of the 
heteroscedasticity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on presenting and interpreting the results from the econometric 
estimation proposed in the preceding chapter. The chapter is broadly divided as section 5.2 
giving a report of the results of unit root and stationarity tests, section 5.3 reports the VAR, 
impulse response, variance decomposition and Granger causality tests.  Lastly, section 5.4 
provides results of the diagnostic tests for the VAR; thereafter the chapter is concluded in 
the last section. 
5.2 Unit root tests 
Various unit root tests to check for the stationarity of variables were conducted. The 
informal unit root tests are presented graphically while the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
the Phillips-Perron are presented as the formal unit root tests. These are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Informal unit root tests 
It is necessary to know about the properties of the time series data used in this study. The 
stationarity of a time series is explored with the usage of informal and formal approaches 
available in econometrics literature. The unit root tests considered both the null hypothesis 
of a random walk without a drift (untrended) and a random walk with a drift (trended). 
The graphs of all five variables used in the study are shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5. 1: Graphical display of variables at level 
The variables and time period running from 1990 to 2012 on a quarterly basis are shown 
on vertical and horizontal axis respectively. The graphs for oilp and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) look like random walk with drift since they are moving upwards. This is 
indicative of a non-stationary series. The exchange rate was trending upwards until 2002, 
thereafter, it became stationary. 
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The Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) and repo rate are also regarded as random walks with 
drift because these variables reflect a definite upward and downward trend respectively. 
Therefore all variables can be concluded as being non-stationary at level series. Having 
found the series non-stationary at levels, the series was all differenced once and the results 
are given in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5. 2: Graphical display of variables at first difference 
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After differenced once, the series became stationary. After such application was conducted, 
it is clear from the graphical presentation that the statistical properties of the time series 
for all variables do not change overtime and are thus stationary. For robustness checks, 
formal unit roots tests were conducted and the results are presented in the next section. 
5.2.2 Formal unit root tests 
The formal unit root tests were carried out on the data series at levels and first differences 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests of which the 
summary of results is presented in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5. 1: Stationarity results of the ADF and PP tests 
  
Notes:   
i. *** (denotes stationarity at 0.01 level of significance), ** (0.05 level of significance), * (0.1 significance level). 
ii. The ADF and PP tests are based on the null hypothesis of unit root 
iii. Δ is the first difference symbol 
 
Variable ADF PP 
None Intercept Trend & 
Intercept 
None Intercept Trend & 
Intercept 
loilp 1.087080 -0.077207 -2.816944 1.304778 -0.366535 -2.565112 
Δloilp -8.365924*** -8.448125*** -8.584040*** -7.843122*** -8.094978*** -8.126885*** 
lEXC 1.559656 -1.574430 -1.421667 1.264720 -1.575839 -1.659526 
ΔlEXC -7.374683*** -7.587840*** -7.597550*** -7.409148*** -7.565796*** -7.572112*** 
lCPI -1.023454 -4.241196*** -4.720301*** -1.231691 -2.904063** -3.083787 
ΔlCPI -7.239393*** -7.213950*** -7.215139*** -4.999151*** -4.949682*** -4.906102*** 
lRepo -1.322036 -1.395927 -3.279132* -1.408943 -0.758326 -2.307120 
ΔlRepo -5.507191*** -5.645714*** -5.630860*** -4.875856*** -4.950462*** -4.933132*** 
lGDP 2.975059 -0.130727 -3.241020* 5.109119 1.111623 -3.503018** 
ΔlGDP -1.493211 -2.767521* -2.677106 -11.88752*** -15.56734*** -17.21696*** 
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Both the ADF and PP tests are in agreement of having found no stationarity for oilp and 
exchange rate (EXC) at levels under any assumption since the reported t-statistic is less 
negative than the critical value. CPI is non stationary under ADF and PP test of none 
assumption at levels, for intercept assumption CPI is stationary at 1% of the ADF test but 
stationary at 5% under PP test. While for trend and intercept assumption stationarity is 
found at 1% of the ADF test but no stationarity found under PP test.  
Repo is only stationary at the weakest significance level of 10% in the ADF test of trend and 
intercept assumption at levels and is non stationary under all other assumptions in both 
tests at level series. 
GDP is positive and hence not stationary at level series in both tests of none assumptions, 
no stationarity is found in both tests at intercept assumption and stationarity is found at 
10% under ADF test at levels in trend and intercept assumption while in PP test, this is at 
5%. As the most desirable case is when all variables are integrated of the same order 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2011), the variables were differenced once in both tests and thereafter 
all series are stationary at 1% level of significance under all assumptions.  
The results from Table 5.1 above also confirmed that differencing once was all that was 
required to bring the variables to their stationary levels of significance. The finding is that 
all five variables are stationary at first differences in both ADF and PP tests under any 
assumption and as such are integrated of order one [I (1) series]. The null hypothesis was 
that the variables have unit root against the alternative hypothesis having no unit root. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the variables have unit roots and conclude 
that there is no unit root in the variables at first difference. Having established the absence 
of unit roots, we are confident to proceed to the VAR analysis. 
5.3 VAR Analysis 
This section shows the interpretation of the VAR model that is shown on Appendix 2. The 
main focus is to conduct impulse response function and variance decomposition analysis 
but first, the appropriate lag length to be used on the VAR analysis is determined. 
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5.3.1 Lag length selection criteria 
An important preliminary step in model building and analysis is the selection of the VAR 
lag order. The common information criteria in lag length selection is the Likelihood ratio 
test (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). The results of 
the model of such tests performed were to determine the optimal lag length in the VAR 
model used in our predictions as demonstrated in Table 5.2. 
Table 5. 2: VAR lag order selection criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP)    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 05/14/14   Time: 13:17     
Sample: 1990Q1 2012Q4     
Included observations: 83     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  441.9418 NA   1.84e-11 -10.52872  -10.38300* -10.47018 
1  488.9155  87.15611  1.09e-11 -11.05821 -10.18393 -10.70697 
2  508.7305  34.37769  1.24e-11 -10.93326 -9.330418 -10.28933 
3  556.9402  77.83262  7.20e-12 -11.49254 -9.161123 -10.55590 
4  617.0991  89.87591   3.18e-12*  -12.33974* -9.279758  -11.11041* 
5  634.0275  23.25112  4.08e-12 -12.14524 -8.356696 -10.62322 
6  651.7630  22.22269  5.27e-12 -11.97019 -7.453080 -10.15547 
7  669.9968  20.65043  6.97e-12 -11.80715 -6.561474 -9.699733 
8  707.6308   38.08743*  6.07e-12 -12.11159 -6.137342 -9.711470 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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As shown in Table 5.2, the lag length to be selected for use in the VAR model is 0 and/or the 
4th lag according to the widely used SC and AIC criteria.  It is established whether 0 period 
lag in VAR model is sufficient to capture dynamics in the changes of variables.  In doing this, 
the residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were tested where lag 0 was found not 
to be capturing the dynamics of variables but lag 4 suggested by AIC, FPE and HQ did. As 
stated by Kalyanaraman and Tuwajri (2014), a model will be misspecified if the lag length 
is too small and is over parameterised if the number of lags is too large. A maximum lag of 
greater than four would reduce the degrees of freedom for estimation (Eltony and Al-Awai, 
2001). Therefore the appropriate lag order to use in this study is 4. Upon successful 
establishment of the appropriate lag length for this study, impulse response function to 
determine the size and the speed of the effect of oil price on selected economic indicators 
were conducted. 
5.3.2 Impulse response function 
Figure 5.3 depicts the reaction of the four variables to movements in the oil price using a 
horizon of 1st to 10th quarterly period. The x-axis give the quarter’s number after the shock 
whereas the y-axis show the standard deviation shock to the innovations in each variable.  
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Figure 5. 3: Impulse response of economic indicators to oil price 
EXC: an immediate increase of EXC’s response to oil shocks is seen from the first quarter. 
This remains the case right through to the 3rd quarter. The South African Rand is a floating 
currency that is affected by supply and demand conditions. Between the 3rd and the 4th 
quarter, the shock is almost ignored as slight movements of EXC’s response are found. 
From the 4th quarter to the 6th, the response of EXC decreases and finally does not respond 
significantly towards the end of the 10th quarterly period. This analysis slightly differs from 
that of Ito (2010) who found oil price increases to contribute to the weakening of the 
Russian exchange rate in the short-run but in their study, the contribution increases in 
effects right through to the 8th quarter whereas in this analysis, the shock of the oil price to 
EXC declines in effects and is eventually ignored.  
CPI: from Figure 5.3 above, it could be realised that a one standard deviation positive shock 
to oil price increases CPI 2 quarters (6 months later) after the shock and continues 
increasing it until the 3rd quarter thereafter it decreases it towards quarter 4 and continues 
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decreasing it to quarter 5. Thereafter CPI increases to the 6th period. CPI continues 
fluctuating and after 2 ½ years CPI is on a decreasing trend. Pasaogullari and Waiwood 
(2014) results suggest that “higher oil prices today do not necessarily signal higher CPI 
inflation next year, although they do help to explain short-term movements in the CPI”. The 
results of this study seem to support this view. Although the rate of inflation is under South 
African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) supervision, the speed with which oil price filters through 
to affect it seems to depend on many things.  
Repo: the reaction of repo to oil price shocks increases reaching high levels in the 3rd 
quarter. Once again, indicating a positive association of repo and oil price as expected. This 
may be due to the inflationary pressures created by oil price increases. Since the SARB 
utilises interest rates as a primary anchor in its monetary policy framework, increases in 
oil prices might initiate expectations of higher inflation thereby bringing an upward 
pressure on interest rates. This is consistent with a case study of Greece by Papapetrou 
(2001) who concluded that an oil price shock has a positive impact on interest rates in 
Greece.  
Cuevas and Topak (2008) argues that an oil price shock may not demand a restrictive 
monetary policy stance as long as the permanent change in relative energy price does not 
lead to a change in the underlying trend rate in inflation-a crucial assumption. During the 
2006/12-2007/05 period the repo was kept constant at 9% throughout this period while 
inflation kept fluctuating from 5.8, 6.9 to 7%. Again in 2007/12-2008/03 period, the repo 
maintained stability at 11% when inflation was on an increasing trend. Then in 2008/06-
2008/11, the repo was initially kept stable at 12% ignoring the increasing rate of inflation 
which increased monthly from 12.2%, 13.4%, and 13.7%. The repo was changed two 
months after the inflation eased off. The implication drawn from this is the SARB observes 
the inflation but does not necessarily respond, in the form of interest rates, each time this 
variable changes unless a relatively continuous rate of increase in inflation is seen. As 
mentioned in the discussion of CPI, CPI increases 2 quarters after the shock thereafter it 
begins decreasing. The repo increases 3 quarters after the shock that is, after having 
observed that CPI is consistent in its trend. As the repo increases 3 quarters after the shock 
of oil price, CPI decreases on the 3rd quarter. Cuevas and Topak (2008) suggests that 
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monetary policy is not looking to offset the first round (or direct) effects of oil price as 
these may be unavoidable but rather is more concerned with containing the second round, 
that is, the eventual impact or indirect effects of oil price shocks.   
GDP: in the same way, shocks of oil to GDP quarterly decreases GDP from the 1st to the 2nd 
quarter. Two periods after the shock, an increase in GDP is experienced just for a short 
while to the 3rd quarter. Thereafter, on the 3rd quarter to the 4th GDP drops heavily. 
Significant declining levels are seen as GDP is below the zero line indicating a negative 
relationship between oilp and GDP as per the apriori expectation. If oilp goes up, GDP 
reacts negatively. In the 7th quarter, GDP has picked up again but not to the level it was in 
the 3rd quarter. The up-down cycle continues and at the end of the 10th period GDP is 
downward sloping. The results regarding GDP are in contrast with those of an Algerian 
economy carried by Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud (2012) who found a positive impact of oil 
prices on real GDP in the long-term. 
This could be attributed to the fact that Algeria is an oil-producing country while South 
Africa is not. South African GDP responds in a negative way to oil price increases while the 
Algerian GDP reacts positively to oil price increases. According to Bina and Vo (2007), 
OPEC member countries, which include Algeria are heavily reliant on oil revenues as their 
main source of income and foreign exchange.  
The results of the impulse response function are supported by the results of the variance 
decomposition in the next section. 
5.3.3 Variance decomposition 
The results of the variance decomposition with a 10 period horizon is presented in 
Appendix 4 to provide means of measuring the relative importance of shocks in explaining 
variations in the variables of concern. 
EXC: increases to oil price contribute much to the increases in real exchange rate. In some 
periods, this effect increases where on the 1th period, the oil price had contributed by 15%, 
in the 3rd quarter the effect was 18% and thereafter the effect was around 19%. This 
finding is consistent with that of Akpan (2007) although in the case of Nigeria, the 
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explanation declines in effects, oil price still explain most of the variation in the exchange 
rate. The high oil price gives rise to wealth effects that appreciates the exchange rate. In 
South Africa, the opposite is true. Again, this may be attributed to the fact that South Africa 
is a net oil-importer. 
CPI: besides CPI itself, EXC has the most contributing percentage to shocks in CPI followed 
by the repo. The explanation could be that when the Rand strengthens it prevents domestic 
price from rising or when oil is paid for in foreign currency, there is a risk of importing 
price inflation. The repo as an instrument for monetary policy helps maintain the inflation 
rate goals by influencing price movements (Fadiran and Edun, 2013). SARB adjusts its repo 
rate to accommodate inflationary pressures. Notwithstanding this however, in the event of 
an oil shock, the SARB is allowed to deviate from its inflation target and explain the 
behaviour to the public (Degaard, 2012). We have seen in chapter 2 when the inflation rate 
was 9%, 9.3%, 9.8%, 10.6% exceeding its target in 2007 and 2008 but the repo rate was 
11% in all these events. The deviation can be appropriate when countries experience large 
volatility in their terms-of trade (Frankel, 2006). Oilp affects CPI by 1.90% on average of 
the 10 quarter period, whereas GDP affects it by 0.79%. 
Repo: the repo increase is constantly explained by EXC where EXC explained 26.73% on 
average as opposed to 7.59%, 3.48% and 1.22% explained by CPI, Oilp and GDP 
respectively. The results suggest that oil price shocks do not contribute significantly to 
repo rate as they appear to be the second minimum to have contributed to repo in the 
period under review. Bodenstein, Guerrier and Kilian (2012) states that it is not welfare-
maximizing for monetary policy makers to respond directly to oil price shocks. Monetary 
policy authorities need to first understand why the price of crude oil has changed, 
considering whether it is the result of US productivity, increased demand in China or 
supply disruptions in the Middle East, as there is no standard answer for central bank’s 
response to oil price shocks. Therefore, prices of oil may not call for the same monetary 
policy response but the optimal response of monetary policy by central banks may be 
different depending on the source of the oil price shock. In the first chapter this was 
evidenced when between 2010 and 2011 oil prices fluctuated greatly ranging from 
US$76/bl to US$123/bl while the repo seemed fairly stable at 7%/6%/5.5%. WAMA 
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(2009) claims that, increases in real interest rates have in the past undermined domestic 
investment which pushed the country deeper into recession and producing stagflation.  
GDP: except in only two quarters, the 8th and the 10th where EXC explains GDP, oilp is 
contributing the most to variations in GDP. An oil-importing country exporting non-oil 
energy products, to some extent, benefit from an unfavorable oil shock (Peersman and 
Robays, 2009). South Africa has companies such as SASOL and PetroSA that export coal and 
gas which fall into the category of alternative energy products. This implies that it is not 
wholly bad for South Africa to experience oil price increases because as oil prices go up, 
prices of alternative energy products tend to rise as well induced by the increased demand 
of these alternative energy products.  
From the above analysis, it can be noted that each variable is the highest contributor of its 
own change. For EXC, this is clear after noticing that it ranges between 74 to 84% 
independently contributing to itself; CPI is from 56 to 88%, repo from 59 to 66% and GDP 
from 72 to 86%. Having completed the analysis of both impulse response and variance 
decomposition, the next analysis focuses on causality relationships between the variables. 
A shock to the ith variable will directly affect that variable and will pass-through to all of 
the other variables in the system through the dynamic structure of the VAR (Brooks, 2008). 
5.3.4 Granger-causality tests 
To determine whether there is causal relationship between variables, Granger-causality 
tests were carried and the results are reported in Table 5.3 below. The results show the 
probability limit value for all possible pairs of variables. A variable does not Granger-cause 
another if its p-value is above 10% level of significance in which case a conclusion is drawn 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the variables do not Granger-cause each other. 
In the same way, a rejection of the null where the p-value is less than 10% significance 
level, would imply that the first series Granger-causes the second series and vice versa.  
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Table 5. 3: Summarised results of Granger-causality 
GDP Granger-cause Oilp  Oilp does not Granger-cause GDP 
Oilp Granger-cause EXC  EXC does not Granger-cause Oilp 
EXC Granger-cause CPI  CPI does not Granger-cause EXC 
Repo Granger-cause CPI  CPI does not Granger-cause Repo 
From the results of the Granger-causality tests, it may be concluded where applicable that, 
a one-sided relationship exists between the variables. GDP Granger-causes oilp at 90% 
confidence interval but in turn oilp does not Granger-cause GDP. In an investigation by 
Ghalayini (2011), oil prices do not Granger-cause GDP for Russia, China and India. The 
market in these countries is more controlled by government regulations implying that 
inflation is better controlled. In addition, Suleiman (2013) finds oil prices to Granger-cause 
GDP for the group of net oil exporting countries but fails to establish that it Granger-cause 
GDP for net oil importing countries. This means that oil prices have a strong influence on 
economic output of net oil exporting countries with little or no influence on the economic 
output of net oil importing countries.  
Oilp Granger-cause EXC at 95% confidence interval, EXC does not Granger-cause oilp. EXC 
Granger-cause CPI at 90% confidence interval, CPI does not Granger-cause EXC. Lastly, 
Repo Granger-cause CPI at 10% level of significance but CPI does not Granger-cause repo in 
South Africa. The Granger-causality test results of the current study are supported by those 
of Zhang (2011) where oil cause exchange rate but exchange rate does not cause oil and 
also Ozturk, Feridun and Kalyoncu (2008) causality results show a one way causality going 
from oil to exchange rate.  
According to Suleiman (2013) “the causality test has often been misperceived as the effect 
test even though it has clearly been stated by Granger (1969) that the test is not a cause or 
effect test but rather used for prediction purposes”. Therefore, it is of particular importance 
to come to the knowledge and understanding of this phenomenon during interpretations of 
Granger-causality tests. 
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5.4 Diagnostic checks 
The VAR model was subject to rigorous diagnostic tests for the purpose of figuring out how 
adequate the model used is. Diagnostic checks are essential in this analysis because if there 
is a problem in the residuals from the estimation of the model, it is detected through 
diagnostic tests. This will then be an indication that the model is not efficient such that the 
parameter estimates from such a model may be biased and not be trusted. However, if the 
model passes all these tests, it will be concluded that its results may be entrusted.  
5.4.1 AR Roots 
The AR roots were conducted and the results of this test are produced in Figure 5.4. From 
the results, it is discovered that all roots have modulus less than one.  
Table 5. 4: AR Roots graph 
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All roots lie inside the unit circle indicating that our VAR is stable. As part of diagnostics 
checks, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to check for the effect on the first order 
conditions for a maximum of the likelihood of imposing the hypothesis was carried. The 
Chi-sq test was also carried to determine if there is a significant difference between the 
observed and the expected frequencies according to a specific formulated hypothesis. 
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5.4.2 Autocorrelation 
The LM test for autocorrelation proposed by Breusch and Godfrey in 1981, whose null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation at lag order h is employed. In compliance 
with Wooldridge (2009), the error terms “should not be serially correlated; any serial 
correlation will generally invalidate a test for heteroskedasticity”. Thus it is necessary to 
test for serial correlation prior to testing for heteroscedasticity.  
Table 5. 5: Lagrange Multiplier test results 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  11.57673  0.9897 
2  19.17043  0.7889 
3  11.81236  0.9880 
4  25.76636  0.4201 
5  42.31764  0.0166 
6  11.73371  0.9886 
7  16.85832  0.8869 
8  33.48151  0.1195 
9  21.92261  0.6402 
10  20.80493  0.7034 
11  20.81312  0.7030 
12  21.96484  0.6378 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
The results from Table 5.5 show a p-value of LM = 0.4201 suggesting that there is no 
residual autocorrelation problem at lag order 4 for the model. Therefore as stated by 
Studenmund (2011) since our p-value is larger than 10% level of significance, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and thus the following test of 
heteroscedasticity will be valid.  
5.4.3 Heteroscedasticity 
The results of heteroscedasticity tests are summarised in the following Table 5.6 where the 
joint test probability for heteroscedasticity is demonstrated. 
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Table 5. 6: Joint test 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
619.7838 600 0.2796 
The probability is above 10% and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic 
residuals and conclude that we do not have heteroskedasticity.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter focused on specifying the potential impact of oil price changes on selected 
South African economic indicators. The application of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests revealed non stationarity at levels and variables were differenced 
once to bring them to their stationarity levels. The Vector Autoregression model was 
specified to analyse the impact from both macroeconomic and monetary economic 
perspectives. Several economic indicators were identified as having been affected by oil 
price changes for the period under review. Good results of diagnostic checks allowed 
conclusions with the analyses and interpretations to be made: from the impulse response 
function analysis, it has been learned that higher oil prices do not help to explain short-run 
movements to Consumer Price Index, the Gross Domestic Product responds negatively to 
oil price increases but the level of significance is not much, oil price shocks eventually 
increase the repo rate and the exchange rate is immediately affected by oil price increases. 
Variance decomposition analysis suggested that repo explains most of variations in CPI and 
in turn CPI constantly explains repo, oil price shocks are a considerable source of volatility 
for exchange rate and the Consumer Price Index contributes more to Gross Domestic 
Product other than the variable itself. Granger-causality analysis permits for a conclusion 
that the interaction between oil prices and economic indicators is at least one direction for 
the exchange rate and does not exist for other variables, that is, the interaction between oil 
price variables and economic indicators is not found to be significant for other variables 
but significant for exchange rate, with the direction of causality going in at least one 
direction.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
6.1 Summary and conclusions 
The study investigated the impact of oil price changes on selected economic indicators in 
South Africa in the period 1990Q1-2012Q4. The specific objectives outlined in the first 
chapter of the study were to review the nature and trends of oil prices and economic 
indicators, to econometrically examine the impact of oil prices on the South African 
exchange rate, inflation, repo rate and Gross Domestic Product for the period and finally to 
make conclusions and policy recommendations. The study made a null hypothesis that oil 
prices do not have a negative impact on selected South African economic indicators against 
an alternative hypothesis that oil prices have a negative impact on selected South African 
economic indicators. The second chapter gave an overview of the South African economy in 
relation to long-run trends of oil prices and economic indicators. Chapter 3 outlined the 
analysis of theoretical and empirical literature while chapter 4 discussed the methodology 
to this study and explanation of variables employed in the model. Finally, chapter 5 
presented the analysis and interpretation of results.  
The country experienced large oil price increases during the period of 1990 to 2012 and 
the reason are those that South Africa is not so well endowed with oil reserves and 
production and as such the country imports most of its oil from the Middle East nations 
which have regularly undergone political unrests and wars. It is widely believed that a 
country highly dependent on oil imports especially from the unstable nations in the Middle 
East is likely to experience movements in oil prices, consequently affecting its economic 
indicators negatively. However, the trends of oil prices and economic indicators are not 
consistent. There were periods where the country experienced a rise oil prices and 
economic indicators rose and years when oil prices were low and economic indicators 
declined. In other periods oil prices would be fairly stable but economic indicators would 
be unfavourable.  
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Schools of thought regarding the impact of oil price changes on economic indicators shared 
different sentiments. Hubbert model about peak oil, that oil discovery in an area increases 
production but gradually reaches the highest point and declines, suggests that as 
production increases during new discoveries of oil reserves, oil prices are likely to 
decrease. In turn as production decrease, oil prices increase. Various theoretical 
mechanisms through which oil price affects economic indicators were discussed. These 
include the supply side effect, wealth transfer effect, demand side effect, cost of living 
effect, unemployment effect, investment effect, inflation effect, price and monetary 
transmission effect and the real balance effect. The empirical studies support the 
arguments posed by the theoretical mechanisms, although with different economic 
reasoning. 
Based on an extensive review of literature on the effects of oil price and economic 
indicators, an empirical model that links oil prices and economic indicators was specified. 
The variables employed in the model of this study included Oilp [oil price], EXC [SA Rands 
against US Dollar], CPI [consumer price index], Repo [interest rate] and GDP [gross 
domestic product]. The study employed the Vector Autoregression methodology as this 
method has advantages over other techniques. Furthermore, stationarity on the time series 
data was checked by using both informal and formal tests. The results from the informal 
and formal tests indicated that the time series were stationary and integrated of the same 
order after being differenced once. The results in chapter 5 have indicated short-run 
negative impact of oil prices on selected economic indicators in South Africa. Oil price 
changes had affected economic indicators in the past 22 years. The results also show that 
understanding the monetary policy transmission mechanism is important, especially for 
decision making by the central bank and government during expansionary and 
contractionary economic periods, and more so, under an inflation targeting regime. 
6.2 Policy implications and recommendations  
This section addresses policy implications and recommendations but first, policy 
authorities need to identify important market factors that are contributing to rising oil 
prices, their impact on the economy and to work towards addressing these. The current 
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study identified and addressed these in chapter 2 as: geopolitical factors in oil-importing 
nations and oil supply shocks thereof. Having identified important market factors of oil 
price and economic activity, recommendations for policy are provided. These are twofold 
focusing on monetary and fiscal policy.  
Allowing oil prices to be the sole rationing factor considered in policy making related to oil 
price shocks is not the best. The country’s response to oil price changes should depend on 
the size and speed of the shock, the perceived duration of the oil shock and the economy’s 
dependency on oil. As previously mentioned, it is not all the time oil prices fluctuate, 
monetary policy responds but it is rather during serious variations like those seen in 2003-
2006 and 2007-2008. Therefore it is recommended for oil products such as petrol and 
other products including food items not to necessary increase unless it is during times of 
significant oil price hikes and when the hikes are proved to be long-lasting. The reason is 
that such prices remain up even when oil prices have settled, in other words, the prices of 
these products are sticky in nature. The rich minority will continue to consume petroleum 
products irrespective of the price hike while the poor majority of citizens find the costs to 
be expensive and are heavily affected as petroleum costs comprise a greater portion of 
their expenditure. They spend more on petroleum products and less on other basic items 
like food. Consequently, the gap between the rich and poor will widen.  
As oil shocks create a necessity for government intervention on poverty alleviation, social 
grant programs and other service delivery products and services, the budget of the 
government on the revenue perspective (real tax drops) and expenditure perspective is 
affected. It would be important for fiscal authorities to consider setting up a fund account 
in which they can borrow from, when necessary, to finance budget deficits originating from 
oil price shocks. This could be useful and reduce the chances of borrowing abroad.   
By 2013, South Africa was still importing a whole half of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia. 
Perhaps the country needs to begin diversifying more of its crude oil import sources. It is 
true that the Middle East is the region that is most endowed with oil in the whole world. 
However, it is not the only region producing and exporting oil. South Africa needs to 
diversify its oil import sources even more by maintaining the already existing bilateral 
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relations with stable nations such as Russia, Europe and North America and to consider 
importing oil from such regions. 
6.3 Limitations of the study and areas for further research 
The study specifically focused on South Africa; therefore results obtained may not be 
directly applicable to other economies. For South Africa, the study remains largely 
significant as the conclusions drawn from it may prove to be useful. The study also focused 
on oil price changes on selected economic indicators in South Africa that can be 
accommodated by the model. If other economic indicators could have been added, results 
would have improved.  
The data had to be converted to quarterly (except GDP) as original quarterly data was not 
available. Thereafter, the data was logged and differenced once. Missing observations, as a 
result of differencing, for certain periods may have affected the results. Lastly, the study is 
based on 22 years of data from 1990 to 2012. The period of study is of great significance as 
the democracy came with a number of policies which changed the economic operation of 
the country. Notwithstanding the data limitations, this study provides some insight into the 
relationship between oil price changes and economic indicators in South Africa. The study 
can be extended by including more variables and also by extending the period. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The data used 
Year Oilp EXC CPI Repo 
 1990/01 20.92 2.5562 15.1 18.00 
 1990/02 19.7 2.5452 14.9 18.00 
 1990/03 18.58 2.613 14.9 18.00 
 1990/04 16.96 2.6553 14.6 18.00 
 1990/05 17.04 2.6448 13.9 18.00 
 1990/06 15.84 2.6645 13.6 18.00 
 1990/07 17.34 2.6295 13.3 18.00 
 1990/08 26.42 2.5733 13.6 18.00 
 1990/09 33.41 2.57 14.3 18.00 
 1990/10 35.6 2.5445 14 18.00 
 1990/11 31.92 2.524 15.3 18.00 
 1990/12 27.49 2.5316 14.6 18.00 
 1991/01 23.36 2.5628 14.3 18.00 
 1991/02 18.32 2.5387 15 18.00 
 1991/03 18.58 2.6476 15.7 17.00 
 1991/04 19.04 2.7405 15.6 17.00 
 1991/05 19.49 2.7949 15.2 17.00 
 1991/06 18.52 2.8645 15.2 17.00 
 1991/07 19.42 2.881 15.8 17.00 
 1991/08 19.88 2.8711 15.6 17.00 
 1991/09 20.33 2.8361 15.4 17.00 
 1991/10 21.88 2.8305 16.8 17.00 
 1991/11 21.22 2.7949 15.5 17.00 
 1991/12 18.65 2.7678 16.2 17.00 
 1992/01 17.92 2.7793 15.8 17.00 
 1992/02 18.03 2.8153 15.8 17.00 
 1992/03 17.7 2.881 15.7 16.00 
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 1992/04 18.81 2.8785 15.6 16.00 
 1992/05 19.86 2.8474 14.8 16.00 
 1992/06 21.12 2.8098 15.1 15.00 
 1992/07 20.35 2.7533 14.6 15.00 
 1992/08 19.92 2.7632 14.3 15.00 
 1992/09 20.33 2.798 13.5 15.00 
 1992/10 20.6 2.8835 11.7 15.00 
 1992/11 19.18 2.9958 11 14.00 
 1992/12 18.61 3.0139 9.6 14.00 
 1993/01 17.58 3.0684 9.7 14.00 
 1993/02 18.36 3.1201 9 13.00 
 1993/03 18.84 3.1786 9.7 13.00 
 1993/04 18.94 3.1676 11 13.00 
 1993/05 18.75 3.1756 10.6 13.00 
 1993/06 17.93 3.2338 10 13.00 
 1993/07 16.9 3.3501 9.9 13.00 
 1993/08 16.93 3.3646 9.3 13.00 
 1993/09 16.54 3.4072 9.1 13.00 
 1993/10 17.04 3.3951 9.4 12.00 
 1993/11 15.56 3.3642 9.2 12.00 
 1993/12 13.71 3.375 9.5 12.00 
 1994/01 13.96 3.4093 9.9 12.00 
 1994/02 13.78 3.4503 9.9 12.00 
 1994/03 13.48 3.4535 9 12.00 
 1994/04 14.88 3.5852 7.1 12.00 
 1994/05 16.1 3.6254 7.2 12.00 
 1994/06 16.77 3.6253 7.5 12.00 
 1994/07 17.55 3.6682 8.2 12.00 
 1994/08 17.23 3.5994 9.4 12.00 
 1994/09 16.27 3.5564 10.1 13.00 
 1994/10 16.63 3.5387 9.8 13.00 
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 1994/11 17.03 3.5241 9.9 13.00 
 1994/12 16.15 3.5601 9.9 13.00 
 1995/01 16.51 3.538 9.6 13.00 
 1995/02 16.85 3.5593 9.9 14.00 
 1995/03 16.86 3.5992 10.2 14.00 
 1995/04 18.21 3.6006 11 14.00 
 1995/05 18.23 3.658 10.8 14.00 
 1995/06 17.18 3.6619 10 15.00 
 1995/07 15.95 3.6407 9 15.00 
 1995/08 16.14 3.6408 7.5 15.00 
 1995/09 16.56 3.662 6.4 15.00 
 1995/10 15.99 3.6509 6.3 15.00 
 1995/11 16.64 3.6475 6.4 15.00 
 1995/12 17.77 3.665 6.9 15.00 
 1996/01 17.34 3.641 6.9 15.00 
 1996/02 17.2 3.74 6.5 15.00 
 1996/03 18.65 3.9282 6.3 15.00 
 1996/04 19.78 4.2057 5.5 16.00 
 1996/05 18.81 4.3727 5.9 16.00 
 1996/06 18.17 4.3502 6.9 16.00 
 1996/07 19.42 4.3888 7.1 16.00 
 1996/08 20.14 4.524 7.5 16.00 
 1996/09 22.57 4.4968 8.4 16.00 
 1996/10 24.05 4.5726 9.1 16.00 
 1996/11 22.92 4.6556 9.2 17.00 
 1996/12 23.57 4.6816 9.4 17.00 
 1997/01 23.34 4.6442 9.4 17.00 
 1997/02 20.79 4.4527 9.8 17.00 
 1997/03 19.66 4.4361 9.6 17.00 
 1997/04 18.3 4.4412 9.9 17.00 
 1997/05 19.21 4.4683 9.5 17.00 
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 1997/06 18.16 4.4981 8.8 17.00 
 1997/07 18.37 4.5574 9.1 17.00 
 1997/08 18.8 4.6841 8.7 17.00 
 1997/09 18.65 4.6901 8 17.00 
 1997/10 20.23 4.709 7.5 16.00 
 1997/11 19.43 4.8361 6.8 16.00 
 1997/12 17.69 4.8707 6.1 16.00 
 1998/01 15.75 4.9391 5.6 16.00 
 1998/02 14.89 4.9357 5.4 16.00 
 1998/03 13.88 4.9711 5.4 15.00 
 1998/04 14.32 5.0461 5 14.93 
 1998/05 14.42 5.0918 5.1 18.00 
 1998/06 13.62 5.3609 5.2 20.21 
 1998/07 13.1 6.2386 6.6 21.35 
 1998/08 12.44 6.3226 7.6 21.85 
 1998/09 13.66 6.1215 9.1 21.86 
 1998/10 13.38 5.8071 9 20.72 
 1998/11 12.04 5.6595 9.4 19.73 
 1998/12 10.27 5.8857 9 19.32 
 1999/01 11.1 5.9835 8.9 18.83 
 1999/02 10.61 6.1107 8.6 17.36 
 1999/03 12.75 6.209 7.9 16.51 
 1999/04 15.42 6.1133 7.7 15.67 
 1999/05 15.89 6.1815 7.1 15.46 
 1999/06 16.15 6.0883 7.3 14.92 
 1999/07 18.7 6.106 4.9 13.65 
 1999/08 20.47 6.1295 3.2 13.44 
 1999/09 22.6 6.0593 1.9 12.40 
 1999/10 22.11 6.0928 1.7 12.19 
 1999/11 24.53 6.1374 1.9 12.00 
 1999/12 25.25 6.146 2.2 12.00 
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 2000/01 25.41 6.1194 2.6 11.75 
 2000/02 27.68 6.3156 2.4 11.75 
 2000/03 27.44 6.4597 3.4 11.75 
 2000/04 22.75 6.612 4.6 11.75 
 2000/05 27.67 7.0205 5.1 11.75 
 2000/06 29.61 6.9274 5.1 11.75 
 2000/07 28.68 6.8762 5.9 11.75 
 2000/08 30.07 6.9514 6.8 11.75 
 2000/09 33.06 7.1614 6.8 11.75 
 2000/10 31.03 7.4673 7.1 12.00 
 2000/11 32.47 7.6734 7.1 12.00 
 2000/12 25.67 7.6392 7 12.00 
 2001/01 25.52 7.7714 7.1 12.00 
 2001/02 27.62 7.815 7.8 12.00 
 2001/03 24.47 7.8833 7.4 12.00 
 2001/04 25.5 8.0813 6.5 12.00 
 2001/05 28.38 7.9671 6.4 12.00 
 2001/06 27.94 8.055 6.3 11.00 
 2001/07 24.61 8.1965 5.3 11.00 
 2001/08 25.7 8.3072 4.6 11.00 
 2001/09 25.67 8.6272 4.4 9.50 
 2001/10 20.58 9.2684 4 9.50 
 2001/11 18.88 9.7182 4.3 9.50 
 2001/12 18.74 11.5467 4.6 9.50 
 2002/01 19.5 11.608 5 10.50 
 2002/02 20.19 11.4843 5.9 10.50 
 2002/03 23.46 11.4938 6.2 11.50 
 2002/04 25.7 11.0796 7.4 11.50 
 2002/05 25.38 10.1472 7.8 11.50 
 2002/06 24.1 10.1392 8 12.50 
 2002/07 25.78 10.1137 9.6 12.50 
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 2002/08 26.68 10.5894 10.4 12.50 
 2002/09 28.35 10.6044 11.2 13.50 
 2002/10 27.66 10.328 13 13.50 
 2002/11 24.45 9.6509 12.9 13.50 
 2002/12 28.17 8.9597 12.4 13.50 
 2003/01 31.3 8.6816 11.6 13.50 
 2003/02 32.57 8.3031 10.3 13.50 
 2003/03 30.96 8.0439 10.2 13.50 
 2003/04 24.94 7.7068 8.8 13.50 
 2003/05 25.76 7.6652 7.8 13.50 
 2003/06 27.54 7.9027 6.7 12.00 
 2003/07 28.39 7.5481 5.2 12.00 
 2003/08 29.85 7.3922 5.1 11.00 
 2003/09 27.26 7.3246 3.7 10.00 
 2003/10 29.46 6.9637 1.5 8.50 
 2003/11 28.83 6.7287 0.4 8.50 
 2003/12 29.75 6.5159 0.3 8.00 
 2004/01 31.33 6.9179 0.2 8.00 
 2004/02 30.68 6.7686 0.7 8.00 
 2004/03 33.74 6.6328 0.4 8.00 
 2004/04 33.1 6.5537 0.2 8.00 
 2004/05 37.4 6.7821 0.6 8.00 
 2004/06 35.39 6.4351 1.2 8.00 
 2004/07 37.9 6.1287 1.6 8.00 
 2004/08 42.67 6.4575 1 7.50 
 2004/09 42.81 6.5469 1.3 7.50 
 2004/10 49.66 6.3876 2.4 7.50 
 2004/11 43.45 6.0558 3.7 7.50 
 2004/12 39.77 5.7323 3.4 7.50 
 2005/01 44.07 5.9698 3 7.50 
 2005/02 45.34 6.0161 2.6 7.50 
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 2005/03 52.95 6.0103 3 7.50 
 2005/04 51.22 6.146 3.4 7.00 
 2005/05 48.05 6.3314 3.3 7.00 
 2005/06 53.86 6.75 2.8 7.00 
 2005/07 57.49 6.7035 3.4 7.00 
 2005/08 64.44 6.465 3.9 7.00 
 2005/09 62.98 6.3578 4.4 7.00 
 2005/10 58.82 6.5766 4 7.00 
 2005/11 55.46 6.6565 3.4 7.00 
 2005/12 56.64 6.3591 3.6 7.00 
 2006/01 62.89 6.0891 4 7.00 
 2006/02 59.91 6.1177 3.9 7.00 
 2006/03 61.56 6.2544 3.4 7.00 
 2006/04 70.51 6.072 3.3 7.00 
 2006/05 69.66 6.3199 3.9 7.00 
 2006/06 68.15 6.9549 4.9 7.50 
 2006/07 73.66 7.0843 5 7.50 
 2006/08 73.2 6.9553 5.4 8.00 
 2006/09 61.74 7.4098 5.3 8.00 
 2006/10 57.44 7.6492 5.4 8.50 
 2006/11 58.31 7.2586 5.4 8.50 
 2006/12 62.89 7.0406 5.8 9.00 
 2007/01 53.72 7.1838 6 9.00 
 2007/02 57.68 7.1698 5.7 9.00 
 2007/03 62.19 7.3514 6.1 9.00 
 2007/04 67.83 7.1216 7 9.00 
 2007/05 67.69 7.0187 6.9 9.00 
 2007/06 71.57 7.1718 7 9.50 
 2007/07 77.85 6.973 7 9.50 
 2007/08 71.71 7.2334 6.7 10.00 
 2007/09 77.97 7.1282 7.2 10.00 
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 2007/10 82.83 6.7729 7.9 10.50 
 2007/11 93.19 6.701 8.4 10.50 
 2007/12 91.19 6.8271 9 11.00 
 2008/01 92.78 6.9871 9.3 11.00 
 2008/02 95.66 7.6386 9.8 11.00 
 2008/03 104.7 7.9799 10.6 11.00 
 2008/04 108.73 7.7933 11.1 11.50 
 2008/05 123.04 7.6238 11.7 11.50 
 2008/06 132.15 7.9188 12.2 12.00 
 2008/07 133.86 7.6393 13.4 12.00 
 2008/08 114.61 7.6578 13.7 12.00 
 2008/09 99.12 8.0472 13.1 12.00 
 2008/10 73.26 9.6715 12.1 12.00 
 2008/11 53.57 10.1177 11.8 12.00 
 2008/12 41.8 9.9456 9.5 11.50 
 2009/01 43.71 9.897 8.1 11.50 
 2009/02 43.14 10.0062 8.6 10.50 
 2009/03 46.61 9.9932 8.5 9.50 
 2009/04 50.25 9.018 8.4 9.50 
 2009/05 57.42 8.3723 8 7.50 
 2009/06 68.56 8.0518 6.9 7.50 
 2009/07 64.77 7.9513 6.7 7.50 
 2009/08 72.72 7.9415 6.4 7.00 
 2009/09 67.75 7.5235 6.1 7.00 
 2009/10 72.84 7.4833 5.9 7.00 
 2009/11 76.66 7.5182 5.8 7.00 
 2009/12 74.62 7.4894 6.3 7.00 
 2010/01 76.46 7.4527 6.2 7.00 
 2010/02 73.79 7.6612 5.7 7.00 
 2010/03 78.69 7.4258 5.1 6.50 
 2010/04 84.7 7.3434 4.8 6.50 
95 
 
 2010/05 76.38 7.6332 4.6 6.50 
 2010/06 74.74 7.6473 4.1 6.50 
 2010/07 75.52 7.5468 3.7 6.50 
 2010/08 77.06 7.2973 3.5 6.50 
 2010/09 77.66 7.1389 3.2 6.00 
 2010/10 82.62 6.9177 3.4 6.00 
 2010/11 85.36 6.972 3.6 5.50 
 2010/12 91.47 6.8294 3.5 5.50 
 2011/01 96.27 6.9021 3.7 5.50 
 2011/02 103.35 7.1911 3.7 5.50 
 2011/03 114.08 6.9086 4.1 5.50 
 2011/04 123.3 6.7324 4.2 5.50 
 2011/05 114.69 6.861 4.6 5.50 
 2011/06 113.83 6.7875 5 5.50 
 2011/07 116.36 6.7931 5.3 5.50 
 2011/08 110.28 7.0598 5.3 5.50 
 2011/09 112.83 7.5214 5.7 5.50 
 2011/10 109.53 7.95 6 5.50 
 2011/11 111.3 8.1553 6.1 5.50 
 2011/12 108.45 8.1745 6.1 5.50 
 2012/01 110.97 8.0106 6.3 5.50 
 2012/02 119.15 7.6552 6.1 5.50 
 2012/03 125.38 7.5998 6 5.50 
 2012/04 119.98 7.8275 6.1 5.50 
 2012/05 110.41 8.1524 5.7 5.50 
 2012/06 95.5 8.3962 5.5 5.50 
 2012/07 102.47 8.2466 4.9 5.00 
 2012/08 113.1 8.2752 5 5.00 
 2012/09 113.24 8.2784 5.5 5.00 
 2012/10 112.12 8.6444 5.6 5.00 
 2012/11 109.36 8.7944 5.6 5.00 
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 2012/12 109.94 8.6385 5.7 5.00 
 
Year GDP 
 1990/01 267056 
 1990/02 270894 
 1990/03 273379 
 1990/04 275572 
 1991/01 264134 
 1991/02 268068 
 1991/03 271123 
 1991/04 272509 
 1992/01 262332 
 1992/02 264224 
 1992/03 263278 
 1992/04 263007 
 1993/01 257157 
 1993/02 265177 
 1993/03 270820 
 1993/04 272676 
 1994/01 261765 
 1994/02 276421 
 1994/03 279549 
 1994/04 282565 
 1995/01 272575 
 1995/02 279230 
 1995/03 290145 
 1995/04 292631 
 1996/01 283053 
 1996/02 296237 
 1996/03 300760 
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 1996/04 303393 
 1997/01 292826 
 1997/02 305964 
 1997/03 307807 
 1997/04 308171 
 1998/01 296580 
 1998/02 306386 
 1998/03 308270 
 1998/04 309817 
 1999/01 299684 
 1999/02 312120 
 1999/03 316838 
 1999/04 321205 
 2000/01 310326 
 2000/02 322664 
 2000/03 333322 
 2000/04 335462 
 2001/01 322026 
 2001/02 334676 
 2001/03 338469 
 2001/04 342212 
 2002/01 333306 
 2002/02 347204 
 2002/03 350396 
 2002/04 355529 
 2003/01 343995 
 2003/02 358345 
 2003/03 360923 
 2003/04 364059 
 2004/01 356887 
 2004/02 371714 
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 2004/03 379044 
 2004/04 384685 
 2005/01 376327 
 2005/02 391002 
 2005/03 399722 
 2005/04 404031 
 2006/01 395449 
 2006/02 410298 
 2006/03 420695 
 2006/04 432679 
 2007/01 421784 
 2007/02 433014 
 2007/03 442196 
 2007/04 454171 
 2008/01 437678 
 2008/02 454887 
 2008/03 459649 
 2008/04 462380 
 2009/01 433797 
 2009/02 442772 
 2009/03 450509 
 2009/04 459822 
 2010/01 443936 
 2010/02 457731 
 2010/03 465818 
 2010/04 475523 
 2011/01 460863 
 2011/02 474374 
 2011/03 481032 
 2011/04 493074 
 2012/01 473284 
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 2012/02 488293 
 2012/03 491516 
 2012/04 503351 
 
Appendix 2: The Vector Autoregression model 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 05/14/14   Time: 13:15    
 Sample (adjusted): 1991Q2 2012Q4    
 Included observations: 87 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP) 
      
      D(LOILP(-1))  0.219182 -0.003429  0.116936  0.068454  0.015338 
  (0.13504)  (0.06693)  (0.24523)  (0.06423)  (0.01083) 
 [ 1.62310] [-0.05123] [ 0.47684] [ 1.06574] [ 1.41604] 
      
D(LOILP(-2)) -0.268339  0.131967  0.243220  0.093485  0.011432 
  (0.13470)  (0.06676)  (0.24461)  (0.06407)  (0.01080) 
 [-1.99213] [ 1.97671] [ 0.99431] [ 1.45912] [ 1.05805] 
      
D(LOILP(-3)) -0.130813  0.131238  0.012974 -0.024438 -0.010576 
  (0.13188)  (0.06536)  (0.23949)  (0.06273)  (0.01058) 
 [-0.99193] [ 2.00785] [ 0.05417] [-0.38959] [-0.99979] 
      
D(LOILP(-4)) -0.053692  0.022750  0.118728 -0.021767 -0.006898 
  (0.13115)  (0.06500)  (0.23817)  (0.06238)  (0.01052) 
 [-0.40939] [ 0.34998] [ 0.49851] [-0.34893] [-0.65574] 
      
D(LEXC(-1))  0.086792  0.252290  0.394838  0.034515  0.015146 
  (0.29893)  (0.14816)  (0.54285)  (0.14218)  (0.02398) 
 [ 0.29034] [ 1.70286] [ 0.72735] [ 0.24275] [ 0.63165] 
      
D(LEXC(-2)) -0.206009  0.029294  0.617080  0.194487 -0.009214 
  (0.29599)  (0.14670)  (0.53751)  (0.14079)  (0.02374) 
 [-0.69600] [ 0.19969] [ 1.14803] [ 1.38143] [-0.38808] 
      
D(LEXC(-3)) -0.460102  0.328575  0.829742  0.001163 -0.028111 
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  (0.29419)  (0.14581)  (0.53425)  (0.13993)  (0.02360) 
 [-1.56394] [ 2.25342] [ 1.55309] [ 0.00831] [-1.19124] 
      
D(LEXC(-4))  0.467622 -0.137616  0.794691  0.058111 -0.015569 
  (0.29546)  (0.14644)  (0.53655)  (0.14053)  (0.02370) 
 [ 1.58271] [-0.93976] [ 1.48113] [ 0.41351] [-0.65694] 
      
D(LCPI(-1))  0.007809  0.005767  0.201831 -0.011521  0.003442 
  (0.06947)  (0.03443)  (0.12616)  (0.03304)  (0.00557) 
 [ 0.11241] [ 0.16750] [ 1.59986] [-0.34866] [ 0.61770] 
      
D(LCPI(-2))  0.004779 -0.008547 -0.272565 -0.021202  0.004581 
  (0.06843)  (0.03392)  (0.12427)  (0.03255)  (0.00549) 
 [ 0.06983] [-0.25201] [-2.19338] [-0.65139] [ 0.83462] 
      
D(LCPI(-3)) -0.006179 -0.001600  0.049623  0.001835 -0.009134 
  (0.06761)  (0.03351)  (0.12277)  (0.03216)  (0.00542) 
 [-0.09140] [-0.04774] [ 0.40419] [ 0.05707] [-1.68429] 
      
D(LCPI(-4)) -0.045045  0.016495 -0.306586 -0.010347  0.004783 
  (0.06171)  (0.03058)  (0.11206)  (0.02935)  (0.00495) 
 [-0.72997] [ 0.53934] [-2.73588] [-0.35252] [ 0.96630] 
      
D(LREPO(-1)) -0.293600 -0.176027  1.216388  0.689411  0.002568 
  (0.31539)  (0.15631)  (0.57274)  (0.15001)  (0.02530) 
 [-0.93092] [-1.12611] [ 2.12382] [ 4.59568] [ 0.10151] 
      
D(LREPO(-2)) -0.269567  0.187869 -0.320994 -0.340461 -0.027313 
  (0.37905)  (0.18787)  (0.68834)  (0.18029)  (0.03040) 
 [-0.71117] [ 1.00001] [-0.46633] [-1.88838] [-0.89831] 
      
D(LREPO(-3))  0.134371 -0.203794 -0.111171  0.281018  0.020073 
  (0.38382)  (0.19023)  (0.69700)  (0.18256)  (0.03079) 
 [ 0.35009] [-1.07130] [-0.15950] [ 1.53931] [ 0.65199] 
      
D(LREPO(-4)) -0.236674  0.185098 -1.006563 -0.203549 -0.028625 
  (0.32890)  (0.16301)  (0.59728)  (0.15644)  (0.02638) 
 [-0.71959] [ 1.13549] [-1.68526] [-1.30113] [-1.08501] 
      
D(LGDP(-1))  0.801697 -0.239363  0.856444  0.272684 -0.184983 
  (0.94606)  (0.46890)  (1.71804)  (0.44999)  (0.07589) 
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 [ 0.84740] [-0.51048] [ 0.49850] [ 0.60597] [-2.43763] 
      
D(LGDP(-2))  1.128727 -0.475855  0.428375  0.059541 -0.135367 
  (0.95587)  (0.47376)  (1.73586)  (0.45466)  (0.07667) 
 [ 1.18083] [-1.00442] [ 0.24678] [ 0.13096] [-1.76549] 
      
D(LGDP(-3))  2.442914 -0.635526  2.578685  0.692625 -0.111080 
  (0.93438)  (0.46311)  (1.69682)  (0.44443)  (0.07495) 
 [ 2.61448] [-1.37231] [ 1.51972] [ 1.55844] [-1.48207] 
      
D(LGDP(-4))  1.895758 -0.191475  1.691213  0.177568  0.793321 
  (0.97424)  (0.48286)  (1.76920)  (0.46339)  (0.07815) 
 [ 1.94589] [-0.39654] [ 0.95592] [ 0.38319] [ 10.1517] 
      
C -0.025706  0.012394 -0.095465 -0.021635  0.004698 
  (0.02774)  (0.01375)  (0.05037)  (0.01319)  (0.00222) 
 [-0.92678] [ 0.90157] [-1.89528] [-1.63984] [ 2.11156] 
      
       R-squared  0.317156  0.223450  0.570060  0.456481  0.876400 
 Adj. R-squared  0.110233 -0.011868  0.439775  0.291778  0.838945 
 Sum sq. resids  1.162035  0.285453  3.832167  0.262900  0.007477 
 S.E. equation  0.132690  0.065765  0.240963  0.063114  0.010643 
 F-statistic  1.532728  0.949566  4.375485  2.771544  23.39894 
 Log likelihood  64.28683  125.3543  12.38013  128.9346  283.7938 
 Akaike AIC -0.995100 -2.398950  0.198158 -2.481255 -6.041237 
 Schwarz SC -0.399880 -1.803731  0.793377 -1.886036 -5.446018 
 Mean dependent  0.019594  0.013948 -0.011257 -0.014509  0.007412 
 S.D. dependent  0.140669  0.065378  0.321936  0.074996  0.026521 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.70E-13    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.19E-13    
 Log likelihood  650.8368    
 Akaike information criterion -12.54797    
 Schwarz criterion -9.571876    
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Appendix 3: Variance decomposition 
       
        Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
D(LEX
C):       
 Period S.E. D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP) 
       
        1  0.132690  15.25064  84.74936  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.137116  15.36465  82.45763  0.061683  1.992294  0.123743 
 3  0.143502  17.59723  79.70401  0.059521  1.919893  0.719344 
 4  0.149723  19.10916  76.59551  0.194409  2.855028  1.245892 
 5  0.151855  19.80299  74.94222  0.255061  3.734340  1.265392 
 6  0.152617  19.74433  74.46321  0.506240  3.975182  1.311032 
 7  0.153379  19.68640  74.51108  0.507120  3.987972  1.307432 
 8  0.153816  19.64617  74.48548  0.530124  4.012379  1.325846 
 9  0.154134  19.66895  74.39682  0.587916  4.011578  1.334730 
 10  0.154393  19.63612  74.27478  0.673268  4.043267  1.372564 
       
        Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
D(LCPI)
:       
 Period S.E. D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP) 
       
        1  0.065765  2.267470  8.851530  88.88100  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.067526  1.907591  15.36282  76.96098  5.669614  0.099000 
 3  0.068875  2.202157  18.14308  72.71839  6.771920  0.164455 
 4  0.072207  2.241453  21.16862  68.44462  7.278870  0.866444 
 5  0.073018  1.907220  18.02124  65.71144  13.21404  1.146064 
 6  0.073287  1.691535  18.44821  60.09982  18.73328  1.027151 
 7  0.073402  1.630957  19.52767  58.31527  19.34925  1.176854 
 8  0.073483  1.644528  19.90041  58.12703  19.15961  1.168413 
 9  0.073542  1.762980  19.45552  57.77878  19.85914  1.143575 
 10  0.073604  1.766125  19.38635  56.84311  20.88958  1.114831 
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 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
D(LRE
PO):       
 Period S.E. D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP) 
       
        1  0.240963  0.600713  24.11951  8.663408  66.61637  0.000000 
 2  0.270120  0.825614  25.20089  7.434823  66.41562  0.123046 
 3  0.282443  3.813438  26.93999  7.294592  61.75486  0.197113 
 4  0.293771  4.174305  27.78900  7.304905  59.64106  1.090730 
 5  0.319571  4.314248  27.43871  7.429585  59.18398  1.633476 
 6  0.339641  4.213673  27.17951  7.548442  59.30208  1.756297 
 7  0.345905  4.188809  27.16462  7.505638  59.39399  1.746944 
 8  0.347850  4.178753  27.17021  7.527155  59.24657  1.877308 
 9  0.351976  4.219650  27.19603  7.570107  59.12621  1.887998 
 10  0.356543  4.303966  27.14118  7.596552  59.05934  1.898958 
       
        Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
D(LGD
P):       
 Period S.E. D(LOILP) D(LEXC) D(LCPI) D(LREPO) D(LGDP) 
       
        1  0.063114  4.479165  4.043591  1.231446  3.312058  86.93374 
 2  0.077144  5.713761  4.403862  2.072435  3.160775  84.64917 
 3  0.080293  8.155941  4.993294  2.269109  5.095004  79.48665 
 4  0.081704  9.282357  8.344024  5.217474  4.651783  72.50436 
 5  0.082232  6.268531  5.449979  3.700118  3.054542  81.52683 
 6  0.083217  6.047759  5.278050  4.201307  3.323236  81.14965 
 7  0.083482  6.181998  5.673213  4.150811  3.817214  80.17676 
 8  0.083587  7.256961  7.389695  4.406884  3.888088  77.05837 
 9  0.083688  6.122459  5.964373  3.607348  3.384245  80.92158 
 10  0.083773  5.958755  5.959290  3.829263  3.362998  80.88969 
       
        Choles
ky       
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Orderin
g: 
D(LOIL
P) 
D(LEX
C) 
D(LCPI) 
D(LRE
PO) 
D(LGD
P) 
       
       
 
Appendix 4: The Granger-causality test results 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 05/14/14   Time: 13:17  
Sample: 1990Q1 2012Q4  
Included observations: 87  
    
        
Dependent variable: D(LOILP)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(LEXC)  5.876721 4  0.2085 
D(LCPI)  0.807471 4  0.9374 
D(LREPO)  3.646418 4  0.4560 
D(LGDP)  8.637273 4  0.0708 
    
    All  18.74235 16  0.2823 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(LEXC)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(LOILP)  9.458498 4  0.0506 
D(LCPI)  0.426792 4  0.9802 
D(LREPO)  2.267926 4  0.6866 
D(LGDP)  2.705839 4  0.6082 
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All  13.29001 16  0.6514 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(LCPI)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(LOILP)  1.346740 4  0.8534 
D(LEXC)  8.808648 4  0.0661 
D(LREPO)  9.013928 4  0.0608 
D(LGDP)  3.724577 4  0.4446 
    
    All  27.87375 16  0.0327 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(LREPO)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(LOILP)  4.468882 4  0.3463 
D(LEXC)  2.500221 4  0.6446 
D(LCPI)  0.888652 4  0.9262 
D(LGDP)  5.008009 4  0.2865 
    
    All  11.66381 16  0.7668 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(LGDP)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(LOILP)  6.231962 4  0.1825 
D(LEXC)  2.639458 4  0.6198 
D(LCPI)  3.824979 4  0.4302 
D(LREPO)  2.025942 4  0.7310 
    
    All  23.35198 16  0.1046 
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Appendix 5: Heteroscedasticity 
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 05/14/14   Time: 13:19    
Sample: 1990Q1 2012Q4    
Included observations: 87    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       619.7838 600  0.2796    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(40,46) Prob. Chi-sq(40) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.506493  1.180263  0.2923  44.06493  0.3036 
res2*res2  0.297942  0.488041  0.9888  25.92093  0.9584 
res3*res3  0.651672  2.151482  0.0064  56.69543  0.0420 
res4*res4  0.550024  1.405692  0.1322  47.85208  0.1841 
res5*res5  0.450715  0.943630  0.5720  39.21219  0.5056 
res2*res1  0.471410  1.025600  0.4644  41.01269  0.4259 
res3*res1  0.504242  1.169678  0.3024  43.86901  0.3109 
res3*res2  0.556506  1.443044  0.1148  48.41600  0.1697 
res4*res1  0.417089  0.822859  0.7340  36.28679  0.6382 
res4*res2  0.522998  1.260893  0.2230  45.50085  0.2538 
res4*res3  0.642960  2.070932  0.0089  55.93756  0.0484 
res5*res1  0.388818  0.731598  0.8422  33.82713  0.7433 
res5*res2  0.436967  0.892510  0.6413  38.01614  0.5599 
res5*res3  0.554871  1.433523  0.1190  48.27382  0.1732 
res5*res4  0.549074  1.400306  0.1349  47.76942  0.1863 
      
      
      
 
